US v Prince - Felon-in-possession

[Euler]

In the Federal District Court of Northern Illinois, Prince's indictment for "felon-in-possession" (of a firearm) was dismissed on November 2, 2023. Strap in.

Opinion said:

...
According to the government, on September 3, 2021, defendant allegedly approached three individuals on a Brown Line Chicago Transit Authority ("CTA") train, brandished a firearm, and robbed them at gunpoint. Among the items allegedly stolen was a cell phone and Ventra card. ... On September 12, 2021, at approximately 11:28 p.m., defendant allegedly swiped the Ventra card at the Red Line CTA station, and proceeded to smoke a cigarette on the platform, which is against a Chicago Transit Board ordinance. Chicago police officers arrested defendant just after midnight, in the early morning of September 13, 2021, and recovered a firearm from his person.

Defendant is charged with unlawful possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(e). ... Defendant has a criminal record that includes prior felony convictions, and a federal grand jury returned an indictment against defendant on April 25, 2022, with one count of unlawful possession of a firearm. The grand jury returned a superseding indictment on June 27, 2023, which added that prior to defendant's alleged prohibited possession of a firearm, defendant had at least three previous convictions for offenses committed on occasions different from one another.

On August 18, 2023, less than four weeks before trial was set to begin, defendant filed the instant motion to dismiss the indictment based on an alleged violation of his rights under the Second Amendment of the United States Constitution. He raises the issue based on the Supreme Court's ruling in New York Rifle & Pistol Assn. v. Bruen ... and the Seventh Circuit's ruling in Atkinson v. Garland .... Consequently, on August 22, 2023, the court granted defendant's motion to continue the trial, and ordered that the jury trial set for September 11, 2023, be stricken and reset to begin on November 28, 2023.
...
The Seventh Circuit instructed the government to develop a record that addresses a series of "interrelated and non-exhaustive questions" which are intended to "help focus the proper analysis on remand." ... These questions are:

1. Does § 922(g)(1) address a 'general societal problem that has persisted since the 18th century?' ...
2. What does history tell us about disarming those convicted of crimes generally and of felonies in particular? ...
3. Are there broader historical analogues to § 922(g)(1) during the periods that Bruen emphasized, including, but not limited to, laws disarming 'dangerous' groups other than felons? ...
4. If the district court's historical inquiry identifies analogous laws, do those laws supply enough of a historical tradition (as opposed to isolated instances of regulation) to support § 922(g)(1)? ...
5. If history supports Atkinson's call for individualized assessments or for a distinction between violent and non-violent felonies, how do we define a non-violent or a non-dangerous felony?

...
Further, the government argues, when an individual commits a felony, that individual experiences the "forfeiture of a number of rights" that are tied to membership in the political community, including the right to serve on a jury, vote, and hold elected office. ...

Defendant counters that Heller's emphasis on "law abiding citizens" was dicta, and interpreting "the people" to exclude felons is inconsistent with how courts have interpreted "the people" in other constitutional text. ...

The court agrees with defendant that Heller and Bruen did not hold that the Second Amendment categorically protects only law-abiding citizens, despite their repeated use of such qualified language as "law abiding citizens." ...

In light of Meza-Rodriguez, and the parties' briefing pursuant to Bruen and Atkinson, this court concludes that the government has not met its burden to prove that felons are excluded from "the people" whose firearm possession is presumptively protected by the plain text of the Second Amendment. ...
...
In the instant case, the government argues that § 922(g)(1) "is part of the historical tradition that delimits the outer bounds of the right to keep and bear arms." ... The government does not argue about whether earlier generations addressed the general societal problem of firearm-related violence with similar or materially different means. Nor could it. ...
...
This court is persuaded that the text, history, and tradition of firearm-dispossession statutes demonstrates that the legislature has the authority to categorically regulate firearm possession by individuals who have demonstrated that they cannot be trusted to obey the law, or pose some other danger to the political community if armed. The record shows that these categorical regulations are not isolated instances, and the Seventh Circuit has already determined that "Congress enacted the [categorical] exclusions in § 922(g) to keep guns out of the hands of presumptively risky people." ... The record shows that the legislature has a longstanding tradition of justifying exclusion from the right to keep and bear arms based on its assessment of that group's risk to the rule of law, whether based on mental health, criminal record, loyalty, or character.

Further, this court rejects the notion that history calls for an individualized assessment of risk, or a distinction between violent and nonviolent felonies. ...

The inquiry required by Bruen, however, is not merely whether a dispossession statute's burden is "comparably justified," but also whether the statute imposes a "comparable burden" on the right itself. ... Specifically, this court is not persuaded that the government has met its burden to show a "distinctly similar," or even a "relevantly similar," historical analogue to § 922(g)(1)'s permanent prohibition on firearm possession by felons, which can be lifted only by expungement, federal pardon, or other method of restoring civil rights that lifts the underlying offense from a "conviction" under § 922(g). ...
...
Thus, this court concludes that § 922(g)(1) imposes a far greater burden on the right to keep and bear arms than the historical categorical exclusions from the people’s Second Amendment right. The government has not demonstrate d why the modern ubiquity of gun violence, and the heightened lethality of today’s firearm technology compared to the Founding, justify a different result. ...

This court's holding also does not change the fact that all individuals, including felons, are prohibited from using firearms to commit crimes and threaten violence ...
...
However, this court is unable to uphold § 922(g)(1) as constitutional due to Bruen's instruction that the government must provide evidence of a historical analogue that is both comparably justified and comparably burdensome of the right to keep and bear arms. Although there are strong policy reasons for doing everything possible to keep guns off our streets and out of our communities -- policies that could be addressed by legislation rather than judicial edict -- this court can find no such historical analog. ...
...

Points of note (IMO):

1. The government uses the argument that people aren't people from the moment they commit a felony (not the moment they're convicted). The judge doesn't buy it.
2. The judge buys that broad categories of people can be disarmed.
3. The judge does not buy that felonies need to be broken into violent and nonviolent classes.
4. The judge points out that committing crime with a firearm is just as illegal for someone with no prior record as it is for someone with a criminal record.
5. The judge rules that categorical disarmament of people with felony records is not supported by the text, history, and tradition of American law.
6. This is the same judge that ruled in US v Freeman.

[Euler]

On November 8, the DOJ filed notice to appeal.

On November 9, the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals assigned docket number 23-3155.

On December 11, the DOJ asked for an extension to file its appellant brief. The court granted the extension to March 25.

[Upholder]

On 12/23/2023 at 12:41 AM, Euler said:

The government has not demonstrate d why the modern ubiquity of gun violence, and the heightened lethality of today’s firearm technology compared to the Founding, justify a different result. ...

 

This right here was an attempt to interest balance, and had it succeeded would have been grounds for appeal.

[ragsbo]

On 12/23/2023 at 12:48 AM, Euler said:

On November 8, the DOJ filed notice to appeal.

On November 9, the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals assigned docket number 23-3155.

On December 11, the DOJ asked for an extension to file its appellant brief. The court granted the extension to March 25.

extension after extension after extension, That is how the government delays ruling on their unconstitutional acts/laws. With their deep pockets (ie our taxes) and personnel, there is no reason for all these extensions. It is their game plan to keep it tied up in redtape so they can deny folks their rights.

[Tvandermyde]

On 12/22/2023 at 10:41 PM, Euler said:

In the Federal District Court of Northern Illinois, Prince's indictment for "felon-in-possession" (of a firearm) was dismissed on November 2, 2023. Strap in.


Points of note (IMO):

1. The government uses the argument that people aren't people from the moment they commit a felony (not the moment they're convicted). The judge doesn't buy it.
2. The judge buys that broad categories of people can be disarmed.
3. The judge does not buy that felonies need to be broken into violent and nonviolent classes.
4. The judge points out that committing crime with a firearm is just as illegal for someone with no prior record as it is for someone with a criminal record.
5. The judge rules that categorical disarmament of people with felony records is not supported by the text, history, and tradition of American law.
6. This is the same judge that ruled in US v Freeman.

1 The same district court applied the same reasoning to reach the same conclusion in six other matters, in which the government has filed notices of appeal. See United States v. Kevin Delaney, No. 23-3156; United States v. Malik Daniel, No. 23-3173; United States v. Devon Freeman, No. 23-3186; United States v. Christopher SalmeNegrete, No. 23-3212; United States v. Johnny Anderson, No. 23-3217; and United States v. Jose Diaz, No. 23-3259. In each of these matters, the government will soon file unopposed motions to stay the appeal pending a decision by this Court in Prince.

[Euler]

On February 26, CA7 set the following schedule:

03/12/2024: US appeal brief due
04/11/2024: Prince's response brief due
05/02/2024: US reply brief due

[Euler]

The government met the appeal brief deadline.

Several states are filing amici briefs.

On March 19, one of those state briefs is Illinois in a brief for Illinois, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Hawaii, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Washington, and Wisconsin. For some reason, it is sealed. The court says it may unseal it after review.

FWIW, that brief is the reason supposedly IL could not file a timely response to all the IL-based petitions at the US Supreme Court.

[Euler]

On April 4, defendant Prince asked for an extension to file a response brief.

On April 5, the court granted the extension. The schedule is now:

5/13: defendant's response is due
6/03: government's reply is due