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Posted
Quote

 

47. At approximately 4:00pm on February 27, 2025, Defendant Cogswell, Defendant
Richmond, and Deputy Fire Commissioner John Gies summoned Plaintiffs and other Engine 86
personnel who were on shift to the apparatus floor.
48. After everyone gathered, Defendant Cogswell addressed all Engine 86 personnel
and explained that IAD was at Engine 86 that day looking for guns and weapons.
49. Defendant Cogswell spoke for a few minutes before ending his address to
Plaintiffs and other Engine 86 personnel by stating, “if you have something, admit to it right now
and make it a lot easier for yourself.” When no one replied, Defendant Cogswell announced that
IAD would immediately conduct searches of the personal vehicles of all Engine 86 personnel.
Defendant Cogswell stated that if anyone refused to cooperate with IAD, they would be
disciplined.
50. All Engine 86 personnel were then ordered to go to the parking lot and stand next
to their personal vehicle with their car keys in hand.

51. Some Plaintiffs initially refused to cooperate with the vehicle searches.
Defendants Cogswell and Richmond told those Plaintiffs, in front of all Engine 86 personnel,
that if they did not cooperate, they would “receive an IR number”, which refers to the CFD’s
disciplinary process. Defendants Cogswell and Richmond repeated their threats of discipline to
Plaintiffs throughout the car search process.
52. On February 27, 2025, Defendants Cogswell and Richmond searched the personal
vehicles of eleven IAFF Local 2 members: Plaintiffs Anderson, Heinrichsen, Hrabak, Jackson,
Nash, Nickel, O’Grady, Pagani, Richard, Santoyo, and Tesch. None of these Plaintiffs had the
same type of vehicle. Instead, each car that IAD searched on that day was a different
manufacturer, model, make, and year. Nearly all the cars were a different color. Despite these
differences, Defendants Cogswell and Richmond searched each car, including the interior
passenger areas, the glove compartment, and consoles. Defendants Cogswell and Richmond also
searched the trunks of some cars.
53. During the vehicle searches, Defendants Cogswell and Richmond indicated that
these searches were based off an anonymous tip.
54. During the vehicle searches, Defendants Cogswell and Richmond frequently
made statements to Plaintiffs that were intended to elicit an incriminating response. For instance,
some Plaintiffs were told that IAD knew who did and did not have a concealed carry permit.
Other Plaintiffs were directly asked if they had a firearms license. None of the Plaintiffs
responded to these questions and statements from Defendants Cogswell and Richmond.
55. After the vehicle searches were finished, Defendants Cogswell and Richmond
searched different areas of Engine 86.
56. Defendants Cogswell and Richmond failed to find any firearms during these
vehicle searches or their search of Engine 86 on February 27, 2025.

 



 

Quote


C. IAD Lacked Reasonable Suspicion to
Conduct the February 28, 2025 Vehicle Searches
57. At approximately 7:50am on February 28, 2025, Defendants Cogswell and
Richmond returned to Engine 86, and they were accompanied by Deputy District Chief Kelly
Burns and Battalion Chief Samuel Kamberis. After roll call, all Engine 86 personnel were told
that IAD would be conducting searches of their personal vehicles.
58. The Plaintiffs on duty that day requested union representation before the vehicle
searches took place, but that request was denied. Defendant Richmond told Plaintiffs that “she
spoke with someone” and that Defendants’ position was that union representation was only
required for investigatory interviews and not searches. Plaintiffs were then specifically told that
if they did not cooperate with the vehicle searches, they would be disciplined.
59. All Engine 86 members were then ordered to go to the parking lot and stand next
to their personal vehicle with their car keys in hand.
60. On February 28, 2025, Defendants Cogswell and Richmond searched the personal
vehicles of twelve IAFF Local 2 members: Plaintiffs Bishop, Boykin, Casey, Dempsey, Hehir,
Johnson, Labak, Muehleis, Obog, Roncal, Rakowiecki, and Santana. Again, none of these
Plaintiffs had the same type of vehicle. Instead, each car that IAD searched on that day was a
different manufacturer, model, make, and year. Nearly all the cars were a different color. Despite
these differences, Defendants Cogswell and Richmond searched each car, including the interior
passenger areas, the glove compartment, and consoles. Defendants Cogswell and Richmond also
searched closed containers within some cars and the trunks other cars.

61. During the vehicle searches, Defendants Cogswell and Richmond frequently
made statements to Plaintiffs that were intended to elicit an incriminating response. For instance,
some Plaintiffs were told that IAD knew who did and did not have a concealed carry permit.
Other Plaintiffs were directly asked if they had a firearms license. None of the Plaintiffs
responded to these questions and statements from Defendants Cogswell and Richmond.
62. Defendants Cogswell and Richmond failed to find any firearms during the vehicle
searches or their search of Engine 86 on February 28, 2025.

 


 

Quote

 

71. Section 2.11 of CFD General Order 13-007 prohibits “[k]eeping of weapons of
any kind or nature in or about the premises of the Fire Department.” A violation of Section 2.11
of CFD General Order 13-007 can result in the termination of employment for a CFD employee.
72. The Chicago Firearms Policy “prohibits all non-peace officer employees from
carrying or possessing firearms inside buildings owned or controlled by the City.”
73. The Chicago Firearms Policy does not prohibit employees from carrying firearms
in their personal vehicles. Instead, the Chicago Firearms Policy only prohibits the following:
Case: 1:25-cv-03362 Document #: 1 Filed: 03/28/25 Page 14 of 24 PageID #:14

15

a. While on duty, a City employee who has obtained a license to carry a concealed
firearm in compliance with applicable state and federal laws may carry a
concealed firearm in any area where firearms are not prohibited by federal, state,
or local law.
b. It is a violation of this policy for an employee, while on or off duty, to carry,
transfer, or store a firearm inside a building or that portion of a building owned or
controlled by the City.
c. It is a violation of this policy for an employee, while on or off duty, to carry,
transfer, or store a firearm inside a City-owned or leased vehicle.
d. It is violation of this policy for an employee, while on duty, to carry a firearm
inside any private residence or residential building without express written
consent from the owner.
e. It is a violation of this policy for an employee, while on or off duty, to violate any
federal, state, or local laws relating to owning, possessing, carrying, transferring,
storing, displaying, or discharging firearms, including, but not limited to, the
Illinois Firearm Concealed Carry Act; the Illinois Criminal Code - Article 5,
Deadly Weapons, 720 ILCS 5/Art. 5 et. seq.; and any City of Chicago Municipal
Code provision, or rule or regulation promulgated thereunder, pertaining to
firearms and other weapons.
74. The Chicago Firearms Policy does not authorize the search of an employee’s
personal property, but states that the “City reserves the right to authorize searches for prohibited
weapons on its property when a violation is reported or when probable cause or reasonable
suspicion is present. Refusal to permit such a search may result in discipline up to and including
discharge.” See Policy Guidelines section of the Chicago Firearms Policy.
75. Upon information and belief, there are no Chicago policies which permit CFD to
conduct the warrantless search of an employee’s personal vehicle based on an unsubstantiated
and anonymous report.

 

Quote


 

STATEMENT OF CLAIMS
COUNT I

42 U.S.C. § 1983 –Violation of the Fourth Amendment and
Plaintiffs’ Right to be Free from Unreasonable Searches and Seizures
Pursuant to the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution

(Plaintiffs v. Defendant City of Chicago)
 

COUNT II

42 U.S.C. § 1983 –Violation of the Fourth Amendment and
Plaintiffs’ Right to be Free from Unreasonable Searches and Seizures
Pursuant to the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution

(Plaintiffs v. Defendants Cogswell and Richmond)
 

COUNT III

Violation of the Illinois Constitution

Plaintiffs’ Right to be Free from Unreasonable Searches and Seizures
Pursuant to Article I, Section 6 of the Illinois Constitution
(Plaintiffs v. Defendant City of Chicago)
 

COUNT IV

Violation of the Illinois Constitution

Plaintiffs’ Right to be Free from Unreasonable Searches and Seizures
Pursuant to Article I, Section 6 of the Illinois Constitution
(Plaintiffs v. Defendants Cogswell and Richmond)

COUNT V
Respondeat Superior
(Plaintiffs v. Defendant City of Chicago)
 

COUNT VI
Indemnification

(Plaintiffs v. Defendant City of Chicago)

 

 

Anderson v Chicago Firefighters.pdf

Posted (edited)
On 4/4/2025 at 4:15 PM, BobPistol said:

Interesting.

 

CFD got a list of CCL holders and "coincidentally" an anonymous tip happens at this fire station and they search the vehicles.

 

Keep your boots on and your wallets closer. I do hope they get to the bottom of the data exposure for this. Outside maybe a sign-in sheet at a CCL renewal course, a person going through wallets, e-mail account login or big box store and the like: someone accessed something.

Ideally, they can identify the anonymous tipper as well. 

 

 

 

 

Edited by crufflesmuth
Posted

My guess is that your CCL status shows up if LE runs your license plate.  A cheap license plate scanner and you can upload the data to several publicly accessible databases to return the vehicle owner however that should not get you to the CCL status, or they could of supplied the license plate scans to someone on the inside of ISP (most likely) who ran the plates and returned the CCL information.  If the ISP did the searches, there would be log files in their system that would show whose login/credentials were used.  

Posted
On 4/4/2025 at 6:40 PM, SiliconSorcerer said:

If it smells like a fish...... it's a fish. 

 

While this WAS a "fishing expedition", the smell is closer to that of a dung heap.  Or an over-used "port-a-potty".

  • 3 weeks later...
  • 1 month later...
Posted
On May 22, the plaintiffs stipulated the dismissal of Johanna Richmond as a defendant and filed an amended complaint. (I haven't read the amended complaint, but it probably just echos the dismissal of Richmond as a defendant.)

Johanna Richmond is a CFD IA investigator and one of the people who (allegedly) conducted the search.
  • 3 weeks later...
Posted (edited)

IIRC CFD works a 24/48 schedule. Surprised they didn't stop by Gold Shift on the 1st. Is Local 2 a part of the suit?

Edited by Tango7
  • 3 weeks later...
Posted
On June 13, 2025 at 08:55 PM CDT, Euler said:
On June 13, the City of Chicago filed a motion to dismiss the case.

On June 16, the judge set the following schedule:

7/7: response to motion to dismiss is due
7/14: reply is due
8/26: status hearing
  • 2 weeks later...
  • 3 weeks later...
  • 5 weeks later...
Posted
On August 6, new defendant Sanjeev Mikhail filed a motion to dismiss the case.

On August 27, plaintiffs responded.

Sanjeev Mikhail has the job title "Senior Investigator." I'm not sure for whom, but presumably he's the replacement for Johanna Richmond (CFD IA).
Posted
Quote

 It is violation of this policy for an employee, while on duty, to carry a firearm
inside any private residence or residential building without express written
consent from the owner.

 

Without expressed written consent? That's a new one, but completely in line with the (D)emagougery we see regularly.

  • 2 weeks later...
Posted
On September 10, the court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss, in part. Since some counts survived the motion to dismiss, the court denied the motion to strike the request for punitive damages. The court also struck the demand to enjoin Chicago and CFD from searching and seizing cars and using anonymous tips as a basis to search and seize cars.

Count I - Violation of US 4A right to be free of unreasonable search and seizure (Defendant City of Chicago)
dismissal granted without prejudice


Count II - Violation of US 4A right to be free of unreasonable search and seizure (Defendants Cogswell and Mikha'il)
dismissal denied


Count III - Violation of IL right to be free of unreasonable search and seizure (Defendant City of Chicago)
dismissal granted with prejudice


Count IV - Violation of IL right to be free of unreasonable search and seizure (Defendants Cogswell and Mikha'il)
dismissal granted with prejudice


Count V - Responeat Superior* (Defendant City of Chicago)
dismissal granted without prejudice


Count VI - Indemnification (Defendant City of Chicago)
dismissal granted without prejudice



*Responeat Superior means supervisors are responsible for the actions of their subordinates.

The court set the following schedule:

09/11: status hearing canceled
10/01: amended complaint, if any, due (The court will not extend the deadline.)
10/22: defendants' response (to whichever complaint applies) due
Posted

So once again, (D)a city, backed by (D)a courts, will walk away, leaving their good order followers to swing (hopefully).

 

Wonder what kind of cushy gig they'll be assigned after conviction as payoff?

Posted
On September 13, 2025 at 06:44 AM CDT, Tango7 said:
So once again, (D)a city, backed by (D)a courts, will walk away, leaving their good order followers to swing (hopefully).

The counts that were dismissed without prejudice can be readdressed in an amended complaint if plaintiffs can come up with a better case for them. The counts that were dismissed with prejudice (which were the ones based on the IL state constitution) are gone forever.
Posted

 

On 9/13/2025 at 5:28 PM, Euler said:


The counts that were dismissed without prejudice can be readdressed in an amended complaint if plaintiffs can come up with a better case for them. The counts that were dismissed with prejudice (which were the ones based on the IL state constitution) are gone forever.

 

Yep. Shame our State seems to protect itself more than the citizens. 

  • 1 month later...
  • 4 weeks later...
Posted
On November 25, the magistrate set the following schedule for discovery:

2025
12/04: discovery disclosures due (basically each party must volunteer people with discoverable information to be deposed)
12/18: written discovery requests due

2026
01/28: status hearing
11/18: fact discovery deadline (not a typo, lots of deposing and facts expected)

TBD: dispositive motions deadline
  • 3 months later...

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