Illinois v. Thompson: Illinois Supreme Court asked to toss law prohibiting open carry of firearms

[Molly B.]

https://www.thecentersquare.com/illinois/article_e8486efe-d2ac-11ef-ba5d-b350ddcd6572.html

Go to link for full article.
 

Quote

 

(The Center Square) – The Illinois Supreme Court is considering whether to find a state firearms statute prohibiting open carry unconstitutional in the case Illinois v. Tyshon Thompson.

Thompson was found guilty of violating state law for having a firearm in a vehicle without a permit in 2020. Despite having a Firearm Owners ID card, he was sentenced to 30 months in prison.

Tuesday, Eric Castaneda with the Office of the State Public Defender urged the Illinois Supreme Court to find Illinois’ aggravated unlawful use of a weapons statute unconstitutional.

 

[ealcala31]

Thompson's public defender wasn't bad.

[Molly B.]

IL Supreme Court rules on this case with their usual contortion of facts  - Thompson loses.

III. CONCLUSION
¶ 53 When the second amendment’s plain text covers an individual’s conduct, the
Constitution presumptively protects that conduct, and the State must then justify its
restriction by demonstrating that it is consistent with this nation’s historical
tradition of firearm regulation. Defendant’s possession of a handgun within his
vehicle constitutes concealed carriage and is presumptively protected. Ordinarily,
the government then would need to affirmatively prove that its modern firearms
regulations are part of the historical tradition that delimits the outer bounds of the
right to keep and bear arms. However, Bruen’s express endorsement of shall-issue
licensure obviates the need for this court to apply the historical-tradition component
of the Bruen analysis to defendant’s facial challenge to the enforcement of CCL
and FOID card licensure through section 24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(A-5). For the reasons
expressed in Bruen itself, Illinois’s shall-issue regime is not facially
unconstitutional under the second amendment

People v. Thompson 2025 open carry.pdf

[yurimodin]

On 6/27/2025 at 10:04 AM, Molly B. said:

For the reasons
expressed in Bruen itself, Illinois’s shall-issue regime is not facially
unconstitutional under the second amendment

 

Except it takes 4 months to get a permit and its magically a felony if you don't have it.........meanwhile in 26 states you just pack & go.

[steveTA84]

Oh look, and the corrupt and bought Justice Rochford issued the opinion.  I’m SHOCKED 

[Molly B.]

Justice David Overstreet was the one judge who got it right - here is his dissent:
 

JUSTICE OVERSTREET, dissenting:

¶ 56 I respectfully disagree with my colleagues’ conclusion that, in New York State

Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1, 38 n.9 (2022), the United States Supreme

Court “expressly” held that shall-issue firearm licensing regimes, like Illinois’s

firearm licensing requirements, pass constitutional muster under second

amendment (U.S. Const., amend. II) standards. On the contrary, I believe the

majority’s conclusion contradicts the Bruen Court’s express holding, which sets out

the required analysis for resolving defendant’s constitutional claim. Accordingly, I

dissent.

 

¶ 57 The issue before this court is defendant’s facial constitutional challenge to

section 24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(A-5) of the Criminal Code of 2012, which defines the

offense of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon (AUUW) (720 ILCS 5/24-

1.6(a)(1), (3)(A-5) (West 2020)). A jury found that defendant committed this

criminal offense by having a loaded, immediately accessible handgun in his vehicle

at a time when he had not been issued a then-valid concealed carry license (CCL)

under Illinois’s Firearm Concealed Carry Act (Concealed Carry Act) (430 ILCS

66/1 et seq. (West 2016)).5 Defendant challenged his conviction on direct appeal

by asserting that the conviction violates his second amendment rights.

 

¶ 58 The appellate court affirmed defendant’s conviction, concluding that Illinois’s

firearm licensing scheme is permissible under the second amendment standards set

out in Bruen. Specifically, the appellate court interpreted footnote 9 of the Bruen

decision as explicitly upholding Illinois’s Concealed Carry Act under second

amendment standards. 2023 IL App (1st) 220429-U, ¶ 58. The majority agrees with

this interpretation of Bruen’s footnote 9. However, I dissent from the majority’s

opinion because I believe the majority has reached an incorrect and unsupported

conclusion with respect to the significance of footnote 9 in Bruen. My interpretation

of Bruen is founded in the elementary principle that, when our country’s highest

court issues crucial, landmark rulings that define the basic meaning of our Bill of

Rights, it does so with clear, direct, and express language, not with hints or indirect

suggestions hidden in a vague footnote in a case where the issue was not raised.

See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 625 n.25 (2008) (“It is

inconceivable that we would rest our interpretation of the basic meaning of any

guarantee of the Bill of Rights upon such a footnoted dictum in a case where the

point was not at issue and was not argued.”). Accordingly, I believe the majority

has resolved defendant’s constitutional challenge in this appeal by reading a

holding into Bruen’s footnote 9 that simply does not exist.

 

¶ 59 The second amendment of our federal constitution endows all citizens with the

fundamental right to keep and bear arms, and this right to do so plays a vital role in

“our system of ordered liberty.” McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 778

(2010). The right codified in the second amendment is deeply rooted in American

history, and we inherited this right from our English ancestors. Bruen, 597 U.S. at

39.

 

¶ 60 The second amendment states, in full, “A well regulated Militia, being

necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear

Arms, shall not be infringed.” U.S. Const., amend. II. The right to “bear arms”

refers to the right to carry a weapon “for the purpose *** of being armed and ready

for offensive or defensive action in a case of conflict with another person.” (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) Heller, 554 U.S. at 584.

 

¶ 61 The second amendment is simple in language terms, but its application in the

face of modern challenges has been anything but simple, as the amendment’s scope

remains fiercely contested. This is true because the right to keep and bear arms is

not a right without limitations. Bruen, 597 U.S. at 21; United States v. Rahimi, 602

U.S. 680, 690-91 (2024). Although the second amendment has a “historically fixed”

meaning, the amendment allows more than just the firearm regulations that existed

in 1791. Bruen, 597 U.S. at 28; Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 691-92.

 

¶ 62 Applying the second amendment’s historical scope to “novel modern

conditions can be difficult and leave close questions at the margins.” (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) Bruen, 597 U.S. at 31. Contemporary courts are charged

with the challenging task of “consideration of modern regulations that were

unimaginable at the founding.” Id. at 28. “The regulatory challenges posed by

firearms today are not always the same as those that preoccupied the Founders in

1791 or the Reconstruction generation in 1868.” Id. at 27. Nonetheless, “the

Constitution can, and must, apply to circumstances beyond those the Founders

specifically anticipated.” Id. at 28.

 

¶ 63 In Heller, the United States Supreme Court made its first effort to reconcile

modern firearm regulations with the right embodied within the language of the

second amendment. To guide lower courts facing second amendment challenges to

modern firearm regulations, the Heller Court defined specific considerations the

courts must consider when addressing the scope of the second amendment in light

of such challenges, holding that the proper analysis “demands a test rooted in the

Second Amendment’s text, as informed by history.” (Emphases added.) Id. at 19

(discussing Heller). The Heller Court, therefore, established a text-and-history

standard for determining the scope of the second amendment. Id. at 19-21, 39.

Applying this standard, the Heller Court held that the second amendment

guarantees an individual right to keep and bear arms unconnected to miliary service

and that this right applied to ordinary citizens within their homes. Heller, 554 U.S.

at 583-84, 635. Heller was the Court’s first in-depth examination of the scope of

the second amendment. Id. at 635.

 

¶ 64 Following Heller, many lower courts incorrectly applied Heller’s text-andhistory

standard by including means-end scrutiny in their second amendment

analyses. Bruen, 597 U.S. at 18-20; Range v. Attorney General United States, 124

F.4th 218, 224 (3d Cir. 2024) (en banc) (explaining how the courts misread a

passing comment in Heller, which indicated that the challenged statute in Heller

would be unconstitutional under any standard of scrutiny). Therefore, in Bruen, the

Court set out to make Heller’s text-and-history standard more explicit to eliminate

this misunderstanding. Bruen, 597 U.S. at 18-24, 31 (noting the lower courts’ error

in applying Heller and underscoring that it presented a detailed explanation of the

text-and-history standard in Bruen to make the standard “endorsed in Heller more

explicit”).

 

¶ 65 The Bruen Court’s occasion to expand on its discussion of this text-and-history

standard arose in the context of a constitutional challenge by two citizens to New

York’s firearm licensing regulations, called the “Sullivan Law” (1911 N.Y. Laws

442), which regulated law-abiding citizens’ ability to carry firearms in public.

Bruen, 597 U.S. at 11-12. As noted by the majority in the present case (see supra

¶ 29), the Court identified New York’s licensing statute as a “may issue” scheme

that granted government authorities discretion to deny licenses based on a perceived

need or suitability. Bruen, 597 U.S. at 13-15. At the time, New York, five other

states, and the District of Columbia had “may issue” licensing schemes that

required citizens to show “proper cause” to be able to carry a handgun in public for

self-protection. Id.

 

¶ 66 To draw a contrast between New York’s firearm licensing regulations that were

at issue in Bruen against some of the other states’ approach to firearm licensing,

the Bruen Court identified 43 states that had what it described as “shall issue”

licensing regulations “where authorities must issue concealed-carry licenses

whenever applicants satisfy certain threshold requirements, without granting

licensing officials discretion to deny licenses based on a perceived lack of need or

suitability.” Id. at 13. The Court identified Illinois’s Concealed Carry Act as one of

the “shall issue” licensing statutes. Id. at 13 n.1.6

 

¶ 67 Under New York’s licensing scheme at issue in Bruen, an individual who

wanted to carry a firearm outside his or her home could obtain an unrestricted

license to “ ‘have and carry’ ” a concealed handgun only if that individual could

prove that “ ‘proper cause exist[ed]’ ” for doing so (id. at 12) (quoting N.Y Penal

Law § 400.00(2)(f) (McKinney 2022)), which required a showing of a special need

for self-protection distinguishable from that of the general community. In Bruen,

the United States Supreme Court was asked to determine whether New York’s

modern firearm licensing scheme passed constitutional muster under second

amendment standards. Id. at 16-17.

 

¶ 68 The Bruen Court emphasized, expressly and in no uncertain terms, that when

courts are faced with this constitutional question, the courts must apply the textand-

history analysis established in Heller. Id. at 24 (When the second amendment’s

plain text covers an individual’s conduct, “[t]he government must then justify its

regulation by demonstrating that it is consistent with the Nation’s historical

tradition of firearm regulation.” (Emphasis added.)). The Bruen Court expressly

stated that it is only after the government meets its burden under the text-andhistory

test “may a court conclude that the individual’s conduct falls outside the

Second Amendment’s unqualified command.” Id.

 

¶ 69 In Bruen, the Court explicitly demonstrated how the text-and-history standard

applies by undertaking this analysis to determine the constitutionality of New

York’s licensing regulations. The Court first applied the text prong of the standard

and concluded that the second amendment’s plain text presumptively guaranteed

the citizens’ right to bear arms in public for self-defense, not just at home as

established in Heller. Id. at 33. Having concluded that New York’s licensing

scheme burdened the two complaining citizens’ second amendment rights, the

Court then turned to the historical prong of the standard, noting that the burden fell

squarely on the government to show that New York’s “proper-cause” requirement

was consistent with our country’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. Id. at

33-34. The Court again emphasized that the citizens’ right to publicly carry is

protected by the second amendment unless the government can carry its burden. Id.

at 34.

 

¶ 70 In an effort to meet their burden with respect to the historical prong of this

standard, the government respondents in Bruen directed the Court to consider an

extensive array of historical precedents that spanned five different time periods,

from medieval times to the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Id. The

Court, however, after an exhaustive analysis of the cited precedents, found that

none of the cited historical precedents offered by the respondents were sufficiently

analogous to justify New York’s regulations, which denied citizens the right to

publicly carry a firearm without a showing of proper cause. Id. at 38-39, 70.

 

¶ 71 To reach this conclusion, the Bruen Court undertook a comprehensive analysis

of the cited historical precursors in light of New York’s regulatory scheme. Id. at

38-71. The Court did not expressly consider any of this widespread historical

evidence to determine the constitutionality of any other, alternative firearm

licensing scheme. It applied the mandatory text-and-history test only to determine

the constitutionality of New York’s requirement that citizens show a special need

to obtain a license to publicly carry a firearm for self-defense.

 

¶ 72 To complete its analysis, the Bruen Court undertook a “long journey through

the Anglo-American history of public carry,” reaching the conclusion that the

Bruen respondents failed to meet their burden to show that New York’s propercause

regime met constitutional muster under the second and fourteenth

amendments. Id. at 70. The Bruen Court, therefore, held that “nder Heller’s textand-

history standard, the proper-cause requirement” is unconstitutional. Id. at 39.

 

¶ 73 Approximately two years after Bruen, in Rahimi, the Court again addressed a

second amendment challenge to a modern gun regulation. The Court applied the

same text-and-history standard to address a defendant’s challenge to a federal

statute (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8)(C)(i) (2018)) that prohibits citizens subject to a

domestic violence restraining order from possessing a firearm when they are a

credible threat to the physical safety of a person. Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 688-90.

 

¶ 74 At the outset of its analysis, the Rahimi Court again reminded lower courts that

they are directed to examine “ ‘constitutional text and history’ ” (id. at 691 (quoting

Bruen, 597 U.S. at 22)) and consider our “ ‘historical tradition of firearm

regulation’ ” to determine the contours of the second amendment when faced with

a second amendment challenge to modern gun regulations (id. (quoting Bruen, 597

U.S. at 17)). The Rahimi Court explained, “if a challenged regulation fits within

that tradition, it is lawful under the Second Amendment.” Id. The court must

determine whether the challenged regulation is consistent with the principles that

underpin our regulatory traditions and determine whether the new law is relevantly

similar to laws that our tradition is understood to permit. Id. at 692. Central to this

inquiry is why and how the regulation burdens the right. Id.

 

¶ 75 After conducting the text-and-history analysis established in Heller and as made

further explicit in Bruen, the Rahimi Court concluded that the federal statute that

prohibits possession of handguns by citizens subject to domestic violence

restraining orders is constitutional under the second amendment. Id. at 693. The

Court held that “[a]n individual found by a court to pose a credible threat to the

physical safety of another may be temporarily disarmed consistent with the Second

Amendment.” Id. at 702.

 

¶ 76 Importantly, for purposes of interpreting footnote 9 in the Bruen decision, the

Rahimi Court did not short-circuit the text-and-history analysis merely because the

end result of the analysis was consistent with “what common sense suggests.” Id.

at 698. Instead, the Rahimi Court required the government to meet its burden under

the historical prong of the test. The Court analyzed the government’s historical

evidence, concluding that the government presented “ample” evidence that the

second amendment permits the disarmament of individuals who pose a credible

threat to the physical safety of others. Id. at 693. Only after applying the text-andhistory

test did the Court reach the “common sense” conclusion that, if “an

individual poses a clear threat of physical violence to another, the threatening

individual may be disarmed.” Id. at 698.

 

¶ 77 Bruen and Rahimi unequivocally illustrate how the Supreme Court’s mandated

text-and-history inquiry, established in Heller, applies when parties raise second

amendment challenges to modern firearm regulations. The courts “must” conduct

this analysis. Bruen, 597 U.S. at 17 (when the plain text of the second amendment

covers an individual’s conduct, “the government must demonstrate that the

regulation is consistent with this Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation”

(emphasis added)); Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 692 (to conduct the appropriate analysis,

“[a] court must ascertain whether the new law is ‘relevantly similar’ to laws that

our tradition is understood to permit” (emphasis added) (quoting Bruen, 597 U.S.

at 29)).

 

¶ 78 Here, contrary to what Heller, Bruen, and Rahimi plainly require, the majority

has bypassed all textual and historical considerations in relation to Illinois’s firearm

regulations by suggesting that Bruen’s footnote 9 embodies a holding that directly

contradicts what Heller, Bruen, and Rahimi expressly state is required. However,

nowhere in Heller, Bruen, or Rahimi does the Court analyze any aspect of Illinois’s

Concealed Carry Act or any other states’ “shall issue” licensing statute under the

text-and-history standard, and the Court offers no express language whatsoever

stating that second amendment challenges to shall-issue licensing schemes are

exempt from consideration of textual and historical issues. Instead, each time the

Court has addressed a second amendment challenge to a modern firearm regulation,

the Court has undertaken the full textual and historical analysis. See Bruen, 597

U.S. at 108, 111 (Breyer, J., dissenting, joined by Sotomayor and Kagan, JJ.)

(noting that in Heller the majority “undertook 40 pages of textual and historical

analysis” and, in Bruen, the majority’s historical analysis consisted of 30 pages of

review of “numerous original sources from over 600 years of English and American

history”).

 

¶ 79 Nothing in any of the Court’s discussion of the text-and-history standard in

Bruen leads to the conclusion that a majority of the Court has, sua sponte,

completed this required comprehensive analysis with respect to shall-issue

licensing regimes, with no post-Heller appeal before the Court raising a challenge

to those licensing regimes. To reach this conclusion, one has to surmise that, at

some point after Heller was decided, a majority of the Court conducted a nonpublic

text-and-history analysis of shall-issue licensing, relieving the government of any

burden of establishing that shall-issue regulations comport with our country’s

historical regulation of firearms and reaching the conclusion that shall-issue

regimes are supported by some unnamed historical precursors. Moreover, in order

to do so, the Court would have had to seek out the relevant historical precursors

from some undefined historical record, without the government’s input or

arguments from any citizen challengers.

 

¶ 80 Absent the above described absurd speculation, the obvious conclusion is that

a majority of the Court has not conducted this required text-and-history analysis.

The Court has not canvassed any historical record furnished by the government to

determine if requiring any license, even one with objective criteria, has analogues

in American history, and the Bruen Court went to great lengths to emphasize that

this was the required inquiry before a court can conclude that any firearm

regulations comply with our constitution’s second amendment.7

 

¶ 81 Considering context, the Bruen Court inserted footnote 9 into its decision after

the Court elaborated on Heller’s text-and-history analysis and just before the Court

explained that applying these principles to New York’s proper-cause requirement

for public carry of a firearm revealed that New York’s statute was unconstitutional.

Id. at 38-39 (majority opinion). In this context, it becomes apparent that the Court

added footnote 9 for the sole purpose of emphasizing that its analysis of New

York’s licensing regime was not applicable to other states’ shall-issue licensing

regimes because New York’s statute was distinguishable. See id. at 38 n.9.

Therefore, the only conclusion that can be reached from the content and context of

footnote 9 is that the text-and-history analysis of “shall issue” licensing statutes will

be different than the analysis set out in Bruen and that Bruen should not be

interpreted as invalidating shall-issue gun licensing regulations that were not

considered in that case. Nothing more can be gleaned from footnote 9.

 

¶ 82 The language of the footnote itself bears this out.8 Footnote 9 begins with a

citation of Justice Hardiman’s dissent in Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 442 (3d Cir.

2012) (Hardiman, J., dissenting), where Justice Hardiman discusses the differences

between may-issue licensing regimes and shall-issue licensing regimes. Bruen, 597

U.S. at 38 n.9. Drake is a pre-Bruen decision where the court addressed the

constitutionality of the may-issue firearm licensing regulations of New Jersey.

Drake, 724 F.3d at 428-30 (majority opinion). Drake did not address any shallissue

regulations, such as Illinois’s. Importantly, like the majority in the present

case, the Drake court majority declined to engage in a “full-blown historical

analysis” (id. at 431) and arguably reached an incorrect conclusion concerning the

requirements of the second amendment as later established in Bruen when the full

historical analysis was conducted by the Court (see id. at 440 (the requirement that

applicants demonstrate a “ ‘justifiable need’ to publicly carry a handgun for selfdefense”

“does not burden conduct within the scope of the Second Amendment’s

guarantee”)). Here, the majority makes the same mistake in refusing to conduct the

required historical analysis. Therefore, the Bruen Court’s citation of the dissent in

Drake is only for purposes of distinguishing between the licensing regimes, not as

a substitution for text-and-history analysis or a veiled message that the analysis is

not necessary for challenges to shall-issue regulations, particularly where the

majority in Drake declined to conduct historical analysis and reached an incorrect

result.

 

¶ 83 Next in footnote 9, the Court cited Heller for the proposition that “shall-issue”

licensing regimes do not require applicants to show an atypical need for armed selfdefense

and, therefore, do not necessarily prevent law-abiding, responsible citizens

from exercising their second amendment right to public carry. Bruen, 597 U.S. at

38 n.9. Again, the Bruen majority’s fleeting mention of Heller in this footnote is a

far cry from the lengthy historical analysis set forth within the body of the decision

itself and set out in Heller. This is particularly true where the Court’s analysis in

Heller was not a textual and historical analysis of a “shall-issue” public carry

firearm licensing statute, and the Court expressly clarified that in neither Bruen nor

Heller did it undertake an exhaustive historical analysis of the full scope of the

second amendment. Id. at 32; Heller, 554 U.S. at 635 (because Heller was the

“Court’s first in-depth examination of the Second Amendment, one should not

expect it to clarify the entire field”). Again, in this context, the Bruen Court’s

citation of Heller in footnote 9 cannot be considered a substitution for the text-andhistory

analysis as the majority concludes in the present case.

 

¶ 84 With respect to the remaining cases the Court cited in footnote 9, Shuttlesworth

v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969), and Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S.

296 (1940), they do not address second amendment challenges under any standard,

much less the required text-and-history standard. At most, these cases are cited in

the footnote as principles that the courts may need to consider when faced with a

second amendment challenge to shall-issue licensing schemes; they are not cited as

justification for bypassing the text-and-history analysis that the Court went to great

lengths to set out in detail in the body of the opinion along with repeated mandatory

directives that the test must be used.

 

¶ 85 In concluding that footnote 9 in Bruen “expressly held” that Illinois’s shallissue

licensing scheme complies with the second amendment, the majority gives

considerable weight to Justice Kavanaugh’s special concurrence joined by Chief

Justice Roberts (Bruen, 597 U.S. at 79-81 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring, joined by

Roberts, C.J.)). See supra ¶¶ 41-42. Undeniably, Justice Kavanaugh’s concurrence

contains the express statement that “shall-issue licensing regimes are

constitutionally permissible, subject of course to an as-applied challenge if a shallissue

licensing regime does not operate in that manner in practice.” Bruen, 597 U.S.

at 80. In addition, Justice Kavanaugh and Chief Justice Roberts provided two votes

that were necessary to the six-justice majority in Bruen. However, those two

justices’ votes, standing alone, do not constitute the Bruen majority. If the Bruen

majority had reached the conclusion that Justice Kavanaugh explicitly stated in his

concurrence, that explicit language would be included within the body of the Bruen

majority opinion, or even in footnote 9, but it is not. Accordingly, it cannot be said

that the Bruen majority reached this additional, unstated conclusion. See Maryland

v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 412-13 (1997) (concurrence is not binding precedent).

 

¶ 86 Furthermore, Justice Alito stated in his concurrence that Bruen “decides

nothing about who may lawfully possess a firearm or the requirements that must be

met to buy a gun.” Bruen, 597 U.S. at 72 (Alito, J., concurring). Justice Alito’s

clarification is equally true concerning the scope of the second amendment as it

relates to any aspect of Illinois’s licensing scheme that was, likewise, not before

the Court in Bruen. See Atkinson v. Garland, 70 F.4th 1018, 1022 (7th Cir. 2023)

(noting that nothing in Bruen allows the court to sidestep the text-and-history

analysis and emphasizing that the courts “must undertake the text-and-history

inquiry the Court so plainly announced and expounded upon at great length”).

 

¶ 87 Accordingly, I agree with defendant that the appellate court below erred in

disregarding the textual and historical analysis. Because the appellate court did not

properly conduct this analysis, I believe this court should vacate the appellate

court’s decision and remand this case to the appellate court with directions that it

consider defendant’s second amendment challenge by applying the textual and

historical analysis mandated by our Supreme Court in Heller, Bruen, and Rahimi

for analyzing second amendment challenges to modern firearms regulations. For

these reasons, I respectfully dissent.

[mab22]

On 6/27/2025 at 5:15 PM, steveTA84 said:

Oh look, and the corrupt and bought Justice Rochford issued the opinion.  I’m SHOCKED 

That, and the idea that the IL Supreme Court would reject something like this is …….. 

Is anyone really “shocked”?

[Smallbore]

Can this brought before the federal sc?

[Euler]

Cases from state SCs can be petitioned to the US SC.

The US SC didn't take Charles Nichols' open carry cases from California. I doubt they'll take one from IL.

[yurimodin]

On 6/29/2025 at 1:17 PM, Smallbore said:

Can this brought before the federal sc?

Probably in 10 years

[JTHunter]

On 6/30/2025 at 9:20 AM, yurimodin said:

Probably in 10 years

 

If even then.