CALEB BARNETT, BRIAN NORMAN,
HOOD’S GUNS & MORE, PRO GUN
AND INDOOR RANGE, and NATIONAL
SPORTS SHOOTING FOUNDATION,
INC.

docket

complaint: https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.ilsd.94464/gov.uscourts.ilsd.94464.1.0.pdf

Application said:

...
This case presents recurring questions about whether a federal transferee court may disregard a sister circuit's mandamus decision vacating an intercircuit transfer; whether plaintiffs facing credible enforcement threats may bring pre-enforcement First and Second Amendment challenges to a criminal ban on distributing and receiving digital firearm files; and whether computer code and related digital files receive First Amendment protection without a file-by-file pleading of "expressiveness." Those questions arise from New Jersey's effort to suppress publication of Defense Distributed's firearm-related digital files, despite prior Fifth Circuit rulings directing that this dispute proceed in Texas. The decision below entrenches a no-forum problem for upstream speech and Second Amendment claims, conflicts with other circuits on First Amendment protection for code, and threatens orderly administration of intercircuit transfer orders.
...

Complaint said:

This suit challenges an Illinois law, 720 ILCS 5/24-3(A)(g), that forces law-abiding adults to wait 72 hours before they can acquire a firearm even if they pass a background check instantly, as most do. Illinois's law does not purport to be tethered to the time it takes to run a background check, or to any other investigatory efforts into whether someone is disqualified from exercising Second Amendment rights. It is instead just an unadorned effort to delay the exercise of Second Amendment rights, on the theory that people who seek to acquire firearms are likely animated by violent intentions that may subside if they are forced to "cool off" for three days.

That kind of "cooling-off period" measure has no historical pedigree whatsoever -- and, indeed, would have been unimaginable at the Founding. To be sure, a few states adopted waiting periods to acquire a firearm in the early twentieth century to facilitate the advent of then-novel background checks, which at the time were a cumbersome and time-consuming endeavor. ...

Complaint said:

...
Illinois law provides a procedure for restoration of firearm rights through petition to circuit court pursuant to 430 ILCS 65/10.

However, Illinois law creates an absolute statutory impossibility for non-residents to access firearm rights restoration through the following scheme:

Step 1: Illinois law requires that an individual must first apply for a Firearm Owner's Identification (FOID) card and be denied before being eligible to petition for restoration of rights under 430 ILCS 65/10.

Step 2: Illinois FOID card applications are restricted exclusively to Illinois residents pursuant to 430 ILCS 65/4, which states that FOID cards shall only be issued to residents of Illinois.

Step 3: Because non-residents are categorically prohibited from applying for FOID cards, they cannot be denied FOID cards.

Step 4: Without a FOID card denial, Illinois law provides no mechanism for non-residents to petition for restoration of firearm rights.
...

Complaint said:

...
On July 17, 2023, at approximately 8:00P.M., Plaintiff Kuhlman was at home when he received a call from his mother, who also resides in Normal. She was at home when a strange man repeatedly knocked on her back door asking to borrow her phone. Kuhlman's mother actually cracked her back door open and gave him her phone to make a call, hoping he would leave after that. However, the man did not leave, and continued to walk around Kuhlman's mother's house while seemingly talking to himself.

Scared for her safety, and unable to handle the situation herself, Kuhlman's mother called the police. Kuhlman's mother then called Kuhlman, who lives nearby, and told him a strange man, who may have a mental illness and of whom she felt threatened, was on her property and outside her door.

At all relevant times, Kuhlman possessed a Firearm Owners Identification card ("FOID card") pursuant to the Firearm Owners Identification Card Act ..., and an Illinois concealed carry license ("CCL") pursuant to the Illinois Firearms Concealed Carry Act ....

Kuhlman rushed over to his mother's house, with his 18-year-old son accompanying him. On the way, Kuhlman called his mother, and she was more distressed during that call than when she called Kuhlman initially. Kuhlman's mother said to him to "Please hurry!"
...
Fearing for his safety, and the safety of his mother and unarmed son, he drew his lawfully-possessed concealed firearm on the stranger, and told him to take his hand out of the bag and put the bag down. The man removed his hand but did not relinquish the bag. While covering the stranger with the pistol, Kuhlman waited for the Normal Police Department ("NPD"), which had not yet arrived.

At no time did Kuhlman discharge his firearm, nor at any time did he cause any harm to the stranger, whether with the firearm or otherwise.

Officers from the NPD -- including Defendant Hines -- arrived at Kuhlman's mother's house, and told Kuhlman to give them his firearm, which he did. The stranger did not turn out to have any weapon in the bag, though Kuhlman could not possibly have known that. The stranger was indeed believed and/or determined by the NPD to be suffering from a mental illness, and the NPD officers had him transported to a local hospital.

The NPD officers, including Hines, returned Kuhlman's firearm to him, and did not arrest or detain him in any way. Kuhlman said goodbye to his mother and went home.
...
However, at some point following the above occurrence, Defendants Hines and Cunningham submitted a "clear and present danger" report about Kuhlman to the Illinois State Police ("ISP") through its IL Law Enforcement Agency Portal, and told the ISP that Kuhlman was a danger to himself or others and that the ISP should revoke Kuhlman's FOID card, which it did along with Kuhlman's CCL.
...
By so burdening Kuhlman's ability to possess a FOID Card, and likewise a CCL, Hines and Cunningham have not only unjustifiably denied him his rights but has potentially effectively imposed a five-year ban -- up to as much as an unending ban-on Kuhlman's right to keep and bear arms for self-defense. At a minimum, Hines and Cunningham have indefinitely denied Kuhlman his rights while he attempts to navigate an intrusive, humiliating, and unwarranted appeal with the Illinois FOID Card Review Board.
...
... ROBERT K. KUHLMAN ... requests this Honorable Court to enter judgment against the Defendants, OFFICER NICHOLAS HINES (Star #20257) and OFFICER SERENA CUNNINGHAM (Star #19306), and to award Kuhlman actual or compensatory damages against Hines and Cunningham, and because they acted maliciously, wantonly, or oppressively, punitive damages, plus the costs of this action, plus attorney's fees ... and such other and additional relief as this Court deems just and proper, including but not limited to a recoupment of all costs expended in prosecuting this action.
...
... ROBERT K. KUHLMAN ... requests this Honorable Court enter judgment in his favor and against the Defendant, TOWN OF NORMAL, ILLINOIS, in the amount awarded to Kuhlman against Defendants Hines and/or Cunningham as damages, attorney's fees, costs and interest, and/or for any settlement entered into between Kuhlman and Hines and/or Cunningham and for whatever additional relief this Court deems equitable and just.
...

Petition said:

...

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether an officer's access of an automatic license plate reader database, which indiscriminately collects and stores personally identifying information and location history and allows for the access of such information retrospectively, constitutes a search for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.
2. Whether a firearm that is capable of automatic fire is an "Arm[]" within the meaning of the Second Amendment.

...

Petition said:

...

Questions Presented

1. Whether Americans must obtain a firearm license from each state to exercise their Second Amendment rights across the Nation.
2. Whether state firearm license reciprocity statutes that do not recognize firearm licenses issued by all other states are valid under N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Bruen ... (2022).
...
In the Eighth Circuit's view, an individual's Second Amendment rights are confined to the borders of the state of where he holds a firearm permit. No matter how many times an ordinary law-abiding citizen proves his worth through a state's firearm licensing process, another state can force him to do it again before he can exercise his "constitutional right to bear arms in public for self-defense." ...

No other constitutional right is treated this way. The Eighth Circuit's uber-federalism view of the right to bear arms is inapposite to the fact that "the Second Amendment has the same meaning in all parts of the United States." ...

In the Eighth Circuit's view, forfeiting the right to bear arms because the state that issued your firearm permit is not on another state's reciprocity list falls outside of the Second Amendment's text. However, the impact on an unrecognized license holder is just like the effect that Hawaii's firearm law had on Wolford's hypothetical "woman who wanted to carry a weapon to defend herself from a violent ex-boyfriend," ... except on a larger geographic scale.

Here, petitioner Jeffrey M. Johnson, Sr., is a long-haul truck driver that travels across the United States and makes regular, annual trips to or through Minnesota. He has licenses to carry firearms issued by Florida and Georgia. Because of the dangers posed to long-haul truck drivers, Johnson always carries a handgun with him for self-defense. But when he travels to Minnesota, state law requires him to unload his weapon and secure it in a container because Minnesota does not grant firearm license reciprocity to fifteen states, including Florida and Georgia.
...
This is not a simple case about whether the Eighth Circuit misread Bruen. It is about whether the Second Amendment can be reduced to a state-line lottery -- a right that vanishes and reappears depending on which government happens to recognize a citizen's credentials at a given moment. No other enumerated constitutional right works this way, and only this Court can say whether the Second Amendment may be treated differently.
...

FPC is suing Denver and the state of Colorado as residents of a dozen or so states are effectively banned from carrying in CO, due to non-resident permits not being issued, along with Denver banning unlicensed open carry, and CO not honoring reciprocal permits from non-residents of those states.

https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.ilsd.93705/gov.uscourts.ilsd.93705.1.0.pdf

Docket

Quote

 

During the August 27, 2026 meeting, representatives from the Connecticut State Police SLFU advised that federally licensed firearms dealers in Connecticut have been calling to ask whether the importation and sale of new GLOCK pistols will be banned effective October 1, 2026, but that they do not know the answer.

...

Based on the vague and ambiguous definition of a “convertible pistol” in Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53-202(a)(4), the Connecticut State Police SLFU’s inability to determine whether the Slimline, V Series, and Gen6 GLOCK pistols are considered to be “convertible pistols” as defined by Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53-202(a)(4), and the lack of a response from the Office of the Connecticut Chief State’s Attorney, there is an actual, substantial, and concrete case and controversy regarding whether the Slimline, V Series, and Gen6 GLOCK pistols are considered to be “convertible pistols” as defined by in Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53-202(a)(4).

 

Glock, Inc. therefore seeks a declaratory judgment that the Slimline, V Series, and Gen6 GLOCK pistols are not considered to be “convertible pistols” as defined in Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53-202(a)(4).

 

In the alternative, Glock, Inc. seeks a declaration that the “convertible pistol” ban is unconstitutional on the basis that it is void for vagueness in violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, bans firearms in common use for lawful purposes without any historical support in violation of the Second and Fourteenth Amendment right to keep and bear arms, and infringes the right to free speech in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.

...
 

 

https://www.ammoland.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/Glock-v-Griffin-complaint.pdf

Glock-v-Griffin-complaint.pdf

"The Second Amendment Foundation (SAF) has reached a settlement agreement with the Contra Costa County Sheriff’s Office over policies that previously prohibited permit holders from carrying handguns equipped with red dot sights or flashlights and an outright ban on the carry of single action only 1911- and 2011-style pistols."

Very narrow win it seems:

"Existing licensees who add a red-dot sight or weapon-mounted light to a listed firearm may also be required to present the firearm for inspection and to qualify with the added accessory."

Petition said:

...

QUESTION PRESENTED

...

Whether the rule that a judge who neutrally adjudicates claims under a statute is not adverse under Article III to a litigant who challenges that statute extends to a judicial officer who, in acting on license applications, personally administers the challenged regulatory scheme rather than resolving disputes between adverse parties.
...

Opinion said:

...
According to the government, on September 3, 2021, defendant allegedly approached three individuals on a Brown Line Chicago Transit Authority ("CTA") train, brandished a firearm, and robbed them at gunpoint. Among the items allegedly stolen was a cell phone and Ventra card. ... On September 12, 2021, at approximately 11:28 p.m., defendant allegedly swiped the Ventra card at the Red Line CTA station, and proceeded to smoke a cigarette on the platform, which is against a Chicago Transit Board ordinance. Chicago police officers arrested defendant just after midnight, in the early morning of September 13, 2021, and recovered a firearm from his person.

Defendant is charged with unlawful possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(e). ... Defendant has a criminal record that includes prior felony convictions, and a federal grand jury returned an indictment against defendant on April 25, 2022, with one count of unlawful possession of a firearm. The grand jury returned a superseding indictment on June 27, 2023, which added that prior to defendant's alleged prohibited possession of a firearm, defendant had at least three previous convictions for offenses committed on occasions different from one another.

On August 18, 2023, less than four weeks before trial was set to begin, defendant filed the instant motion to dismiss the indictment based on an alleged violation of his rights under the Second Amendment of the United States Constitution. He raises the issue based on the Supreme Court's ruling in New York Rifle & Pistol Assn. v. Bruen ... and the Seventh Circuit's ruling in Atkinson v. Garland .... Consequently, on August 22, 2023, the court granted defendant's motion to continue the trial, and ordered that the jury trial set for September 11, 2023, be stricken and reset to begin on November 28, 2023.
...
The Seventh Circuit instructed the government to develop a record that addresses a series of "interrelated and non-exhaustive questions" which are intended to "help focus the proper analysis on remand." ... These questions are:

1. Does § 922(g)(1) address a 'general societal problem that has persisted since the 18th century?' ...
2. What does history tell us about disarming those convicted of crimes generally and of felonies in particular? ...
3. Are there broader historical analogues to § 922(g)(1) during the periods that Bruen emphasized, including, but not limited to, laws disarming 'dangerous' groups other than felons? ...
4. If the district court's historical inquiry identifies analogous laws, do those laws supply enough of a historical tradition (as opposed to isolated instances of regulation) to support § 922(g)(1)? ...
5. If history supports Atkinson's call for individualized assessments or for a distinction between violent and non-violent felonies, how do we define a non-violent or a non-dangerous felony?

...
Further, the government argues, when an individual commits a felony, that individual experiences the "forfeiture of a number of rights" that are tied to membership in the political community, including the right to serve on a jury, vote, and hold elected office. ...

Defendant counters that Heller's emphasis on "law abiding citizens" was dicta, and interpreting "the people" to exclude felons is inconsistent with how courts have interpreted "the people" in other constitutional text. ...

The court agrees with defendant that Heller and Bruen did not hold that the Second Amendment categorically protects only law-abiding citizens, despite their repeated use of such qualified language as "law abiding citizens." ...

In light of Meza-Rodriguez, and the parties' briefing pursuant to Bruen and Atkinson, this court concludes that the government has not met its burden to prove that felons are excluded from "the people" whose firearm possession is presumptively protected by the plain text of the Second Amendment. ...
...
In the instant case, the government argues that § 922(g)(1) "is part of the historical tradition that delimits the outer bounds of the right to keep and bear arms." ... The government does not argue about whether earlier generations addressed the general societal problem of firearm-related violence with similar or materially different means. Nor could it. ...
...
This court is persuaded that the text, history, and tradition of firearm-dispossession statutes demonstrates that the legislature has the authority to categorically regulate firearm possession by individuals who have demonstrated that they cannot be trusted to obey the law, or pose some other danger to the political community if armed. The record shows that these categorical regulations are not isolated instances, and the Seventh Circuit has already determined that "Congress enacted the [categorical] exclusions in § 922(g) to keep guns out of the hands of presumptively risky people." ... The record shows that the legislature has a longstanding tradition of justifying exclusion from the right to keep and bear arms based on its assessment of that group's risk to the rule of law, whether based on mental health, criminal record, loyalty, or character.

Further, this court rejects the notion that history calls for an individualized assessment of risk, or a distinction between violent and nonviolent felonies. ...

The inquiry required by Bruen, however, is not merely whether a dispossession statute's burden is "comparably justified," but also whether the statute imposes a "comparable burden" on the right itself. ... Specifically, this court is not persuaded that the government has met its burden to show a "distinctly similar," or even a "relevantly similar," historical analogue to § 922(g)(1)'s permanent prohibition on firearm possession by felons, which can be lifted only by expungement, federal pardon, or other method of restoring civil rights that lifts the underlying offense from a "conviction" under § 922(g). ...
...
Thus, this court concludes that § 922(g)(1) imposes a far greater burden on the right to keep and bear arms than the historical categorical exclusions from the people’s Second Amendment right. The government has not demonstrate d why the modern ubiquity of gun violence, and the heightened lethality of today’s firearm technology compared to the Founding, justify a different result. ...

This court's holding also does not change the fact that all individuals, including felons, are prohibited from using firearms to commit crimes and threaten violence ...
...
However, this court is unable to uphold § 922(g)(1) as constitutional due to Bruen's instruction that the government must provide evidence of a historical analogue that is both comparably justified and comparably burdensome of the right to keep and bear arms. Although there are strong policy reasons for doing everything possible to keep guns off our streets and out of our communities -- policies that could be addressed by legislation rather than judicial edict -- this court can find no such historical analog. ...
...

1. The government uses the argument that people aren't people from the moment they commit a felony (not the moment they're convicted). The judge doesn't buy it.
2. The judge buys that broad categories of people can be disarmed.
3. The judge does not buy that felonies need to be broken into violent and nonviolent classes.
4. The judge points out that committing crime with a firearm is just as illegal for someone with no prior record as it is for someone with a criminal record.
5. The judge rules that categorical disarmament of people with felony records is not supported by the text, history, and tradition of American law.
6. This is the same judge that ruled in US v Freeman.

https://www.firearmspolicy.org/cheeseman

William Kirk put up a video yesterday. It seems NJ had a bit of a hissy fit over an amicus brief that the DOJ submitted in the case.

Petition said:

...

QUESTION PRESENTED

...
Whether an individual whose sole predicate felony is a non-violent offense may bring an as-applied Second Amendment challenge to § 922(g)(1)'s permanent dispossession of the right to keep and bear arms.
...
The circuit split is deep, acknowledged, and intractable. Nine circuits have weighed in, fracturing six to three in precedential and en banc decisions with vigorous dissents on each side. The Solicitor General has previously urged plenary review because this question has "deeply divided" courts, and there is a "special need for certainty about Section 922(g)(1) given the frequency with which the government brings criminal cases under it." ... Further percolation will not break the impasse. Only this Court can.

The question presented is a threshold and narrow one. The Court need not resolve every application of § 922(g)(1), devise a comprehensive test for which felons may be disarmed, or even decide the merits of Mr. Johnson's as-applied claim. It need only confirm what its precedents already establish: as-applied challenges to § 922(g)(1) are available when the predicate offense is non-violent. That modest holding would free the categorical circuits to undertake the individualized analysis Bruen, Rahimi, and Hemani demand -- and would place the Second Amendment's still-developing post-Heller jurisprudence on the right foundation.
...

Complaint said:

DEMETRIA POWELL, as guardian ad litem and on behalf of her son D.P.; TANYA REESE, as guardian ad litem and on behalf of her son M.R.; and TYWANNA PATRICK, as guardian ad litem and on behalf of her granddaughter J.C., as well as on behalf of a class of similarly situated children,

Plaintiffs,
v.

THE STATE OF ILLINOIS; THE ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF STATE POLICE; BRUCE RAUNER, Governor of the State of Illinois; and LEO P. SCHMITZ, Director of the Illinois Department of State Police,

Defendants.
...
Chicago Is Awash In Gun Violence
...
A Substantial Number of the "Crime Guns" Used in Chicago Come from Chicago Area Gun Dealers
...
The State of Illinois Has Failed To Implement Meaningful Regulation of Gun Trafficking in Illinois, Despite Ample Authority to Do So
...
The Pervasive Gun Violence in Chicago's African-American Neighborhoods Has Caused Thousands of African-American Children to Become Disabled Under the ADA
...
The Plaintiffs' Exposure to Gun Violence Has Left Them Disabled Under the ADA
...
The State of Illinois Is Responsible for Providing Plaintiffs With a High Quality Education
...
WHEREFORE, plaintiffs pray that this Court:

A. Declare that the defendants have violated the rights of the plaintiffs under 740 ILCS 23/5(a)(2), by failing to take reasonable steps to control the gun trafficking that is having an adverse impact on African-American children.

B. Enter an injunction requiring that the defendant Illinois Department of State Police exercise its authority, under applicable law, to adopt reasonable gun trafficking regulations in order to reduce the level of gun violence, including rules and regulations such as those contained in paragraph 28 above, in order to eliminate the adverse racial impact of gun violence on African-American children.

C. Grant plaintiffs their reasonable attorneys' fees, costs and such other relief as may be appropriate.

(430 ILCS 66/65)
Sec. 65. Prohibited areas.

Nothing in this paragraph shall prevent the operator of a child care facility in a family home from owning or possessing a firearm in the home or license under this Act, if no child under child care at the home is present in the home or the firearm in the home is stored in a locked container when a child under child care at the home is present in the home.

http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/ilcs/ilcs3.asp?ActID=3497&ChapterID=39

Miller vs Walker complaint.pdf

Our thanks to the Second Amendment Foundation for taking up this challenge. Please support the SAF in their endeavors to reclaim our rights here in IL!

Complaint said:

...
... This would put innocent firearms sales between law-abiding friends and family members within the reach of federal regulation. Such innocent sales between friends and family would constitute a felony if the seller did not in fact obtain a federal firearms license and perform a background check.

Defendants' claim of authority to implement this scheme dramatically upends both our constitutional traditions and the federal firearms licensing regime Congress designed. Not only does the Final Rule go beyond the Defendants' statutory authority, but it also contradicts the applicable statutory language. The Final Rule is therefore unlawful and this Court should set it aside.
...

Quote

C. IAD Lacked Reasonable Suspicion to
Conduct the February 28, 2025 Vehicle Searches
57. At approximately 7:50am on February 28, 2025, Defendants Cogswell and
Richmond returned to Engine 86, and they were accompanied by Deputy District Chief Kelly
Burns and Battalion Chief Samuel Kamberis. After roll call, all Engine 86 personnel were told
that IAD would be conducting searches of their personal vehicles.
58. The Plaintiffs on duty that day requested union representation before the vehicle
searches took place, but that request was denied. Defendant Richmond told Plaintiffs that “she
spoke with someone” and that Defendants’ position was that union representation was only
required for investigatory interviews and not searches. Plaintiffs were then specifically told that
if they did not cooperate with the vehicle searches, they would be disciplined.
59. All Engine 86 members were then ordered to go to the parking lot and stand next
to their personal vehicle with their car keys in hand.
60. On February 28, 2025, Defendants Cogswell and Richmond searched the personal
vehicles of twelve IAFF Local 2 members: Plaintiffs Bishop, Boykin, Casey, Dempsey, Hehir,
Johnson, Labak, Muehleis, Obog, Roncal, Rakowiecki, and Santana. Again, none of these
Plaintiffs had the same type of vehicle. Instead, each car that IAD searched on that day was a
different manufacturer, model, make, and year. Nearly all the cars were a different color. Despite
these differences, Defendants Cogswell and Richmond searched each car, including the interior
passenger areas, the glove compartment, and consoles. Defendants Cogswell and Richmond also
searched closed containers within some cars and the trunks other cars.

61. During the vehicle searches, Defendants Cogswell and Richmond frequently
made statements to Plaintiffs that were intended to elicit an incriminating response. For instance,
some Plaintiffs were told that IAD knew who did and did not have a concealed carry permit.
Other Plaintiffs were directly asked if they had a firearms license. None of the Plaintiffs
responded to these questions and statements from Defendants Cogswell and Richmond.
62. Defendants Cogswell and Richmond failed to find any firearms during the vehicle
searches or their search of Engine 86 on February 28, 2025.

 

Quote

 

71. Section 2.11 of CFD General Order 13-007 prohibits “[k]eeping of weapons of
any kind or nature in or about the premises of the Fire Department.” A violation of Section 2.11
of CFD General Order 13-007 can result in the termination of employment for a CFD employee.
72. The Chicago Firearms Policy “prohibits all non-peace officer employees from
carrying or possessing firearms inside buildings owned or controlled by the City.”
73. The Chicago Firearms Policy does not prohibit employees from carrying firearms
in their personal vehicles. Instead, the Chicago Firearms Policy only prohibits the following:
Case: 1:25-cv-03362 Document #: 1 Filed: 03/28/25 Page 14 of 24 PageID #:14

15

a. While on duty, a City employee who has obtained a license to carry a concealed
firearm in compliance with applicable state and federal laws may carry a
concealed firearm in any area where firearms are not prohibited by federal, state,
or local law.
b. It is a violation of this policy for an employee, while on or off duty, to carry,
transfer, or store a firearm inside a building or that portion of a building owned or
controlled by the City.
c. It is a violation of this policy for an employee, while on or off duty, to carry,
transfer, or store a firearm inside a City-owned or leased vehicle.
d. It is violation of this policy for an employee, while on duty, to carry a firearm
inside any private residence or residential building without express written
consent from the owner.
e. It is a violation of this policy for an employee, while on or off duty, to violate any
federal, state, or local laws relating to owning, possessing, carrying, transferring,
storing, displaying, or discharging firearms, including, but not limited to, the
Illinois Firearm Concealed Carry Act; the Illinois Criminal Code - Article 5,
Deadly Weapons, 720 ILCS 5/Art. 5 et. seq.; and any City of Chicago Municipal
Code provision, or rule or regulation promulgated thereunder, pertaining to
firearms and other weapons.
74. The Chicago Firearms Policy does not authorize the search of an employee’s
personal property, but states that the “City reserves the right to authorize searches for prohibited
weapons on its property when a violation is reported or when probable cause or reasonable
suspicion is present. Refusal to permit such a search may result in discipline up to and including
discharge.” See Policy Guidelines section of the Chicago Firearms Policy.
75. Upon information and belief, there are no Chicago policies which permit CFD to
conduct the warrantless search of an employee’s personal vehicle based on an unsubstantiated
and anonymous report.

 

Quote

 

STATEMENT OF CLAIMS
COUNT I

42 U.S.C. § 1983 –Violation of the Fourth Amendment and
Plaintiffs’ Right to be Free from Unreasonable Searches and Seizures
Pursuant to the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution

(Plaintiffs v. Defendant City of Chicago)
 

COUNT II

42 U.S.C. § 1983 –Violation of the Fourth Amendment and
Plaintiffs’ Right to be Free from Unreasonable Searches and Seizures
Pursuant to the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution

(Plaintiffs v. Defendants Cogswell and Richmond)
 

COUNT III

Violation of the Illinois Constitution

Plaintiffs’ Right to be Free from Unreasonable Searches and Seizures
Pursuant to Article I, Section 6 of the Illinois Constitution
(Plaintiffs v. Defendant City of Chicago)
 

COUNT IV

Violation of the Illinois Constitution

Plaintiffs’ Right to be Free from Unreasonable Searches and Seizures
Pursuant to Article I, Section 6 of the Illinois Constitution
(Plaintiffs v. Defendants Cogswell and Richmond)

COUNT V
Respondeat Superior
(Plaintiffs v. Defendant City of Chicago)
 

COUNT VI
Indemnification

(Plaintiffs v. Defendant City of Chicago)

 

Anderson v Chicago Firefighters.pdf

Complaint said:

This case concerns a defectively designed pistol, the Sig Sauer P320. Sig Sauer designed the P320 without any external safety features, even though the pistol is effectively cocked (i.e., ready to fire) the moment a round is chambered. ...

But Sig Sauer does not tell consumers about the P320's Defect. Nor does Sig Sauer warn consumers that the P320 is extraordinarily dangerous compared to similar pistols. ...

This case seeks to hold Sig Sauer responsible for selling a needlessly dangerous product to consumers through unfair and deceptive practices in violation of Illinois law. ...
...

1. The case does not allege that there is a malfunction. It effectively stipulates that all unintended discharges are negligent.
2. The negligent discharges are the result of a design which includes a light trigger and no external safety. (In other words, the lack of an external safety is a product defect.)
3. The design of the firearm is SIG's responsibility. Therefore the negligent discharges are SIG's responsibility.

Order said:

The United States indicted Emmanuel Ayala, a postal worker, for possessing a firearm in a Federal facility in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 930(a). Ayala argues that statute is unconstitutional as applied to him because the historical record does not support a law banning firearms in post offices. ... Relying on dicta from earlier cases, the United States responds that the Second Amendment allows it to punish the bearing of arms inside any government building. But the Supreme Court has been clear: the government must point to historical principles that would permit it to prohibit firearms possession in post offices. ... The United States fails to meet that burden. Thus, I dismiss the § 930(a) charge because it violates Ayala's Second Amendment right to bear arms.
...