I'm trying to really dig into this and understand it. Many people are claiming this to be settled case law now, but it doesn't appear to be settled case law to me.
The questions are, does this only apply to employees with similar preambles in their employment agreements? The 7th didnt rule that the employee can store a firearm in the trunk, only that the arbitrators decision is binding.
Does this ruling only apply to local 50 members?
Can an Arbitrator really set case law?
Wouldn't a sign saying no weapons on this property, as per the ruling text, negate the parking lot exemption? That's not my understanding of the FCCL.
P.S. let this also be a warning to everyone, if you wouldn't give someone unrestricted access to your bank account, they probably also don't need to know what you carry.
It's probably not settled case law. Also, arbitration is not case law.
There have been assertions, in this thread and others, that the FCCA prevents companies from creating "no storing guns in the parking lot" policies, because it is legally allowed to store firearms in any car in any parking lot, except at specific places, like nuclear facilities and state colleges, where the parking lot exemption to GFZs doesn't apply. IMHO the law is the law. Companies can still fire employees for reasons other than breaking the law. I think the argument can be made that, if it's legal to have anything (gun or whatever) in a car driving to a place of work, it's unreasonable to fire someone for having that same thing legally in the same car parked while the driver works. However, the FCCA does not say that, nor was labor law amended to say that. There has been no case law I know that addresses that point.
This court ruling affects only the one arbitration, which effectively affects only the one employee.
Arbitrators are not judges. Arbitrators cannot set case law. Arbitrators can be arbitrary. They don't have to follow any precedent. They don't even have to explain any reasoning at all. They can, and frequently do, make settlements completely without reference to the merits of the grievance. My father was the Director of Human Resources at a medium size industrial company. He told me the way the arbitrators settled grievances in which he was involved was to look at the last grievance. Whoever lost the last one, company or union, won the next one. The merits of the grievance were irrelevant. I'll say it again. Arbitrators are not judges. Arbitrators can be arbitrary. They don't have to follow any precedent. They don't even have to explain any reasoning at all.
Legally, no sign overrides the parking lot exception written into the FCCA, but that's only the firearm law, not the labor law.
Ultimately, this case only affirmed that binding arbitration is binding, a result that had already been established with decades of labor law cases.
See I agree with everything yous aid, and though I wish we were wrong, I don't think we are. Others are out there professing this case law to be settled and I think it's not even close.
Anyone else have any other input we may be overlooking?
I agree that this ruling, in no way, decides a thing concerning the FCCA. The only thing that we can glean from this, is that the the arbitrator's interpretation of the law was not challenged by any party, specifically Ameren. They relied solely on the terms of the contract to enforce policy, and did not call into question the legality of the worker's actions outside of that.
To the point of whether or not the law sets up a legal barrier to prohibition by policy, I will briefly mention what I've found in my own quest to answer the question.
There is a "doctrine" followed by the vast majority of at will states called the public policy exception. https://definitions....licy-exception/
Under this exception, an employee is protected from discharge for various reasons, like constitutional rights, discrimination for race, religion, or gender, and statutory rights. It is the statutory rights to which we should pay attention.
The language of the FCCA states "a licensee shall be permitted..." which, I believe from my pedestrian study on the matter, establishes a statutory right for a licensee to store a loaded handgun in a vehicle anywhere in Illinois excepting that which is already governed by federal statute.
This appears to be in line with Rep Phelps response to questioning in floor debate, the ISBA's published position, and ISP's allusion to the right in their current FAQ.