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(CAETANO v. MASSACHUSETTS) Supreme Court reverses Massachusetts' stun gun ban (link)


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Some interesting guidance. Did my best to keep it formatted correctly.

 

 

http://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/032116zor_h3ci.pdf

 

 

Cite as: 577 U. S. ____ (2016)

Per Curiam

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

JAIME CAETANO

v.

MASSACHUSETTS

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME

JUDICIAL COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS

No. 1410078. Decided March 21, 2016

PER CURIAM

.

The Court has held that the Second Amendment ex-

tends, prima facie, to all instruments that constitute

bearable arms, even those that were not in existence at

the time of the founding, District of Columbia v. Heller,

554 U. S. 570, 582 (2008), and that this Second Amend-

ment right is fully applicable to the States,McDonald v.

Chicago, 561 U. S. 742, 750 (2010). In this case, the Su-

preme Judicial Court of Massachusetts upheld a Massa-

chusetts law prohibiting the possession of stun guns after

examining whether a stun gun is the type of weapon

contemplated by Congress in 1789 as being protected by

the Second Amendment. 470 Mass. 774, 777, 26 N. E. 3d

688, 691 (2015).

 

The court offered three explanations to support its

holding that the Second Amendment does not extend to

stun guns. First, the court explained that stun guns are

not protected because they were not in common use at the

time of the Second Amendments enactment.Id.,at 781,

26 N. E. 3d, at 693. This is inconsistent with Hellers clear

statement that the Second Amendment extends . . . to . . .

arms . . . that were not in existence at the time of the

founding. 554 U. S., at 582.

 

The court next asked whether stun guns are dangerous

per se at common law and unusual, 470 Mass., at 781, 26

N. E. 3d, at 694, in an attempt to apply one important

limitation on the right to keep and carry arms,Heller,

554 U. S., at 627; seeibid.(referring to the historical

tradition of prohibiting the carrying of dangerous and

 

2 CAETANO v. MASSACHUSETTS

 

Per Curiam

unusual weapons). In so doing, the court concluded that

stun guns are unusual because they are a thoroughly

modern invention. 470 Mass., at 781, 26 N. E. 3d, at

693694. By equating unusual with in common use at

the time of the Second Amendments enactment, the

courts second explanation is the same as the first; it is

inconsistent with Heller for the same reason.

 

Finally, the court used a contemporary lens and found

nothing in the record to suggest that [stun guns] are

readily adaptable to use in the military. 470 Mass., at

781, 26 N. E. 3d, at 694. But Heller rejected the proposi-

tion that only those weapons useful in warfare are pro-

tected. 554 U. S., at 624625.

 

For these three reasons, the explanation the Massachu-

setts court offered for uphold ing the law contradicts this

Courts precedent. Consequently, the petition for a writ of

certiorari and the motion for leave to proceed in forma

pauperis are granted. The judgment of the Supreme

Judicial Court of Massachusetts is vacated, and the case is

remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with

this opinion.

 

It is so ordered.

 

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And the concurrence.

 

There was no dissent.

 

 

http://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/032116zor_h3ci.pdf

 

Cite as: 577 U. S. ____ (2016)

 

ALITO, J., concurring in judgment

 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

 

JAIME CAETANO v. MASSACHUSETTS

 

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME

JUDICIAL COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS

 

No. 1410078. Decided March 21, 2016

 

JUSTICE ALITO, with whom JUSTICE THOMAS joins,

concurring in the judgment.

 

After a bad altercation with an abusive boyfriend put

her in the hospital, Jaime Caetano found herself homeless

and in fear for [her] life. Tr. 31, 38 (July 10, 2013). She

obtained multiple restraining orders against her abuser,

but they proved futile. So when a friend offered her a stun

gun for self-defense against [her] former boy friend, 470

Mass. 774, 776, 26 N. E. 3d 688, 690 (2015), Caetano

accepted the weapon.

 

It is a good thing she did. One night after leaving work,

Caetano found her ex-boyfriend waiting for [her] outside.

Tr. 35. He started screaming that she was not gonna

[expletive deleted] work at this place any more because

she should be home with the kids they had together.

Ibid. Caetanos abuser towered over her by nearly a foot

and outweighed her by close to 100 pounds. But she didnt

need physical strength to protect herself. She stood her

ground, displayed the stun gun, and announced: Im not

gonna take this anymore. . . . I dont wanna have to [use

the stun gun on] you, but if you dont leave me alone, Im

gonna have to. Id., at 3536. The gambit worked. The

ex-boyfriend got scared and he left [her] alone. Id.,

at 36.

 

It is settled that the Second Amendment protects an

individual right to keep and bear arms that applies

against both the Federal Government and the States.

District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U. S. 570 (2008);

McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U. S. 742 (2010). That right

 

 

2 CAETANO v. MASSACHUSETTS

ALITO, J., concurring in judgment

 

vindicates the basic right of individual self-defense.

Id., at 767; see Heller, supra, at 599, 628. Caetanos en­

counter with her violent ex-boyfriend illustrates the con­

nection between those fundamental rights: By arming

herself, Caetano was able to protect against a physical

threat that restraining orders had proved useless to pre­

vent. And, commendably, she did so by using a weapon

that posed little, if any, danger of permanently harming

either herself or the father of her children.

 

Under Massachusetts law, however, Caetanos mere

possession of the stun gun that may have saved her life

made her a criminal. See Mass. Gen. Laws, ch. 140, §131J

(2014). When police later discovered the weapon, she was

arrested, tried, and convicted. The Massachusetts Su­

preme Judicial Court affirmed the conviction, holding that

a stun gun is not the type of weapon that is eligible for

Second Amendment protection because it was not in

common use at the time of [the Second Amendments]

enactment. 470 Mass., at 781, 26 N. E. 3d, at 693.

 

This reasoning defies our decision in Heller, which

rejected as bordering on the frivolous the argument that

only those arms in existence in the 18th century are pro­

tected by the Second Amendment. 554 U. S., at 582. The

decision below also does a grave disservice to vulnerable

individuals like Caetano who must defend themselves

because the State will not.

 

I

 

The events leading to Caetanos prosecution occurred

sometime after the confrontation between her and her ex-

boyfriend. In September 2011,police officers responded to

a reported shoplifting at an Ashland, Massachusetts,

supermarket. The stores manager had detained a sus­

pect, but he identified Caetano and another person in the

parking lot as potential accomplices. Police approached

the two and obtained Caetanos consent to search her

 

 

Cite as: 577 U. S. ____ (2016)

 

ALITO, J., concurring in judgment

 

purse. They found no evidence of shoplifting, but saw

Caetanos stun gun. Caetano explained to the officers that

she had acquired the weapon to defend herself against a

violent ex-boyfriend.

 

The officers believed Caetano, but they arrested her for

violating Mass. Gen. Laws, ch. 140, §131J, which bans

entirely the possession of an electrical weapon, 470

Mass., at 775, 26 N. E. 3d, at 689.1 When Caetano moved

to dismiss the charge on Second Amendment grounds, the

trial court denied the motion.

 

A subsequent bench trial established the following

undisputed facts. The parties stipulated that Caetano

possessed the stun gun and that the weapon fell within

the statutes prohibition.2 The Commonwealth also did

not challenge Caetanos testimony that she possessed the

weapon to defend herself against the violent ex-boyfriend.

Indeed, the prosecutor urged the court to believe the

defendant. Tr. 40. The trial court nonetheless found

 

1

Specifically, the statute prohibits the possession of any portable

device or weapon from which an electrical current, impulse, wave or

beam may be directed, which current, impulse, wave or beam is de­

signed to incapacitate temporarily, injure or kill. Mass. Gen. Laws,

ch. 140, §131J (2014). The statute includes exceptions for law-

enforcement officers and weapon suppliers, who may possess electrical

weapons designed to incapacitate temporarily. Ibid. Violations are

punishable by a fine of $500 to $1,000, imprisonment of 6 months to 2½

years, or both.

Ibid.

 

2

Stun guns like Caetanos are designed to stun a person with an

electrical current by running a current between two metal prongs on

the device and placing the prongs in direct contact with the person. 470

Mass. 774, 775, n. 2, 26 N. E. 3d 688, 689, n. 2 (2015). A similar device,

popularly known by the brand name Taser, shoots out wires tipped

with electrodes that can deliver an electrical current from a distance.

Tr. 2526. Tasers can also be used like a stun gun without deploying

the electrodesa so-called dry stun. Id., at 26. As the Common­

wealths witness testified at trial, these sorts of electrical weapons are

non-lethal force designed to incapacitatenot killa target. Id.,

at 27.

 

 

 

4 CAETANO v. MASSACHUSETTS

 

ALITO, J., concurring in judgment

 

Caetano guilty, and she appealed to the Massachusetts

Supreme Judicial Court.

 

The Supreme Judicial Court rejected Caetanos Second

Amendment claim, holding that a stun gun is not the type

of weapon that is eligible for Second Amendment protec­

tion. 470 Mass., at 775, 26 N. E. 3d, at 689. The court

reasoned that stun guns are unprotected because they

were not in common use at the time of enactment of the

Second Amendment, id., at 781, 26 N. E. 3d, at 693 (quot­

ing Heller, supra, at 627), and because they fall within the

traditional prohibition against carrying dangerous and

unusual weapons, 470 Mass., at 779, 26 N. E. 3d, at 692

(citing Heller, supra, at 627).

 

II

 

Although the Supreme Judicial Court professed to apply

Heller, each step of its analysis defied Hellers reasoning.

 

A

 

The state court repeatedly framed the question before it

as whether a particular weapon was in common use at

the time of enactment of the Second Amendment. 470

Mass., at 781, 26 N. E. 3d, at 693; see also id., at 779, 780,

781, 26 N. E. 3d, at 692, 693, 694. In Heller, we emphati­

cally rejected such a formulation. We found the argument

that only those arms in existence in the 18th century are

protected by the Second Amendment not merely wrong,

but bordering on the frivolous. 554 U. S., at 582. In­

stead, we held that the Second Amendment extends,

prima facie, to all instruments that constitute bearable

arms, even those that were not in existence at the time of

the founding. Ibid. (emphasis added).3

It is hard to

 

 

 

3

Stun guns are plainly bearable arms. As Heller explained, the

term includes any [w]eapo[n] of offence or thing that a man wears for

his defence, or takes into his hands, that is carr[ied] . . . for the

purpose of offensive or defensive action. 554 U. S., at 581, 584 (inter­

 

 

 

Cite as: 577 U. S. ____ (2016)

 

ALITO, J., concurring in judgment

 

imagine language speaking more directly to the point. Yet

the Supreme Judicial Court did not so much as mention it.

 

Instead, the court seized on language, originating in

United States v. Miller, 307 U. S. 174 (1939), that the

sorts of weapons protected were those in common use at

the time. 470 Mass., at 778, 26 N. E. 3d, at 692 (quot­

ing Heller, supra, at 627, in turn quoting Miller, supra, at

179). That quotation does not mean, as the court below

thought, that only weapons popular in 1789 are covered by

the Second Amendment. It simply reflects the reality that

the founding-era militia consisted of citizens who would

bring the sorts of lawful weapons that they possessed at

home to militia duty, Heller, 554 U. S., at 627, and that

the Second Amendment accordingly guarantees the right

to carry weapons typically possessed by law-abiding

citizens for lawful purposes, id., at 625. While stun guns

were not in existence at the end of the 18th century, the

same is true for the weapons most commonly used today

for self-defense, namely, revolvers and semiautomatic

pistols. Revolvers were virtually unknown until well into

the 19th century,4 and semiautomatic pistols were not

invented until near the end of that century.5 Electronic

stun guns are no more exempt from the Second Amend­

ments protections, simply because they were unknown to

the First Congress, than electronic communications are

exempt from the First Amendment, or electronic imaging

devices are exempt from the Fourth Amendment. Id., at

582 (citing Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521

 

 

 

nal quotation marks omitted).

 

4

See J. Bilby, A Revolution in Arms: A History of the First Repeating

Rifles 23 (2006). Samuel Colt did not patent his famous revolver until

1836.

Ibid.

 

5

See Firearms: An Illustrated History 166 (2014); see also W. Greener,

The Gun and Its Development 524529, 531534 (9th ed. 1910) (dis­

cussing revolvers and self-loading semiautomatic pistols as modern

pistols).

 

 

 

 

6 CAETANO v. MASSACHUSETTS

 

ALITO, J., concurring in judgment

 

U. S. 844, 849 (1997), and Kyllo v. United States, 533 U. S.

27, 3536 (2001)). As Heller aptly put it: We do not inter­

pret constitutional rights that way. 554 U. S., at 582.

 

B

 

The Supreme Judicial Courts holding that stun guns

may be banned as dangerous and unusual weapons fares

no better. As the per curiam opinion recognizes, this is a

conjunctive test: A weapon may not be banned unless it is

both dangerous and unusual. Because the Court rejects

the lower courts conclusion that stun guns are unusual,

it does not need to consider the lower courts conclusion

that they are also dangerous. See ante, at 12. But

make no mistakethe decision below gravely erred on

both grounds.

 

1

 

As to dangerous, the court below held that a weapon is

dangerous per se if it is designed and constructed to

produce death or great bodily harm and for the purpose of

bodily assault or defense. 470 Mass., at 779, 26 N. E. 3d,

at 692 (quoting Commonwealth v. Appleby, 380 Mass. 296,

303, 402 N. E. 2d 1051, 1056 (1980)). That test may be

appropriate for applying statutes criminalizing assault

with a dangerous weapon. See ibid., 402 N. E. 2d, at 1056.

But it cannot be used to identify arms that fall outside the

Second Amendment. First, the relative dangerousness of

a weapon is irrelevant when the weapon belongs to a class

of arms commonly used for lawful purposes. See Heller,

supra, at 627 (contrasting dangerous and unusual weap­

ons that may be banned with protected weapons . . . in

common use at the time). Second, even in cases where

dangerousness might be relevant, the Supreme Judicial

Courts test sweeps far too broadly. Heller defined the

Arms covered by the Second Amendment to include any

thing that a man wears for his defence, or takes into his

 

 

7 Cite as: 577 U. S. ____ (2016)

 

ALITO, J., concurring in judgment

 

hands, or useth in wrath to cast at or strike another.

554 U. S., at 581. Under the decision below, however,

virtually every covered arm would qualify as dangerous.

Were there any doubt on this point, one need only look

at the courts first example of dangerous per se weapons:

firearms. 470 Mass., at 779, 26 N. E. 3d, at 692. If

Heller tells us anything, it is that firearms cannot be

categorically prohibited just because they are dangerous.

554 U. S., at 636. A fortiori, stun guns that the Common­

wealths own witness described as non-lethal force, Tr.

27, cannot be banned on that basis.

 

2

 

The Supreme Judicial Courts conclusion that stun guns

are unusual rested largely on its premise that one must

ask whether a weapon was commonly used in 1789. See

470 Mass., at 780781, 26 N. E. 3d, at 693694. As al­

ready discussed, that is simply wrong. See supra, at 46.

The court also opined that a weapons unusualness

depends on whether it is a weapon of warfare to be used

by the militia. 470 Mass., at 780, 26 N. E. 3d, at 693. It

asserted that we followed such an approach in Miller and

approved its use in Heller. 470 Mass., at 780, 26

N. E. 3d, at 693. But Heller actually said that it would be

a startling reading of Miller to conclude that only those

weapons useful in warfare are protected. 554 U. S., at

624. Instead, Miller and Heller recognized that militia

members traditionally reported for duty carrying the

sorts of lawful weapons that they possessed at home, and

that the Second Amendment therefore protects such

weapons as a class, regardless of any particular weapons

suitability for military use. 554 U. S., at 627; see id., at

624625. Indeed, Heller acknowledged that advancements

in military technology might render many commonly

owned weapons ineffective in warfare. Id., at 627628.

But such modern developments . . . cannot change our

 

 

8 CAETANO v. MASSACHUSETTS

 

ALITO, J., concurring in judgment

 

 

interpretation of the right. Ibid.

 

In any event, the Supreme Judicial Courts assumption

that stun guns are unsuited for militia or military use is

untenable. Section 131J allows law enforcement and

correctional officers to carry stun guns and Tasers, pre­

sumably for such purposes as nonlethal crowd control.

Subduing members of a mob is little different from sup­

press[ing] Insurrections, a traditional role of the militia.

U. S. Const., Art. I, §8, cl. 15; see also ibid. (militia may be

called forth to execute the Laws of the Union). Addition­

ally, several branches of the U. S. armed services equip

troops with electrical stun weapons to incapacitate a

target without permanent injury or known side effects.

U. S. Army, Project Manager Close Combat Systems, PD

Combat Munitions: Launched Electrode Stun Device

(LESD), http://www.pica.army.mil/pmccs/combatmunitions/

nonlethalsys/taserx26e.html (all Internet materials as last

visited Mar. 18, 2016); see U. S. Marine Corps Admin-

istrative Message 560/08 (Oct. 2, 2008) (Marine Corps

guidance for use of Tasers), http://www.marines.mil/

News/ Messages/MessagesDisplay/tabid/13286/Article/1130

24/marine-corps-training-and-use-of-human-electro-muscular­

incapacitation-hemi-dev.aspx; Joint Non-Lethal Weapons

Directorate, Non-Lethal Weapons (NLW) Reference Book

3 (2012) (Department of Defense report stating that

[m]ultiple Services employ Tasers), http://dtic.mil/dtic/

tr/fulltext/u2/a565971.pdf.

 

 

C

 

As the foregoing makes clear, the pertinent Second

Amendment inquiry is whether stun guns are commonly

possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes

today. The Supreme Judicial Court offered only a cursory

discussion of that question, noting that the number of

Tasers and stun guns is dwarfed by the number of fire­

arms. 470 Mass., at 781, 26 N. E. 3d, at 693. This ob­

 

 

9

 

Cite as: 577 U. S. ____ (2016)

 

ALITO, J., concurring in judgment

 

servation may be true, but it is beside the point. Other­

wise, a State would be free to ban all weapons except

handguns, because handguns are the most popular weapon

chosen by Americans for self-defense in the home. Heller,

supra

, at 629.

 

The more relevant statistic is that [h]undreds of thou­

sands of Tasers and stun guns have been sold to private

citizens, who it appears may lawfully possess them in 45

States. People v. Yanna, 297 Mich. App. 137, 144, 824

N. W. 2d 241, 245 (2012) (holding Michigan stun gun ban

unconstitutional); see Volokh, Nonlethal Self-Defense,

(Almost Entirely) Nonlethal Weapons, and the Rights To

Keep and Bear Arms and Defend Life, 62 Stan. L. Rev.

199, 244 (2009) (citing stun gun bans in seven States);

Wis. Stat. §941.295 (Supp. 2015) (amended Wisconsin law

permitting stun gun possession); see also Brief in Opposi­

tion 11 (acknowledging that approximately 200,000 civil­

ians owned stun guns as of 2009). While less popular

than handguns, stun guns are widely owned and accepted

as a legitimate means of self-defense across the country.

Massachusetts categorical ban of such weapons therefore

violates the Second Amendment.

 

 

III

 

The lower courts ill treatment of Heller cannot stand.

The reasoning of the Massachusetts court poses a grave

threat to the fundamental right of self-defense. The Su­

preme Judicial Court suggested that Caetano could have

simply gotten a firearm to defend herself. 470 Mass., at

783, 26 N. E. 3d, at 695. But the right to bear other weap­

ons is no answer to a ban on the possession of protected

arms. Heller, 554 U. S., at 629. Moreover, a weapon is an

effective means of self-defense only if one is prepared to

use it, and it is presumptuous to tell Caetano she should

have been ready to shoot the father of her two young

children if she wanted to protect herself. Courts should

 

 

10

CAETANO v. MASSACHUSETTS

 

ALITO, J., concurring in judgment

 

 

not be in the business of demanding that citizens use more

force for self-defense than they are comfortable wielding.6

Countless people may have reservations about using

deadly force, whether for moral, religious, or emotional

reasonsor simply out of fear of killing the wrong person.

See Brief for Arming Women Against Rape & Endanger­

ment as Amicus Curiae 45. Self-defense, however, is a

basic right. McDonald, 561 U. S., at 767. I am not pre­

pared to say that a State may force an individual to choose

between exercising that right and following her con­

science, at least where both can be accommodated by a

weapon already in widespread use across the Nation.

 

* * *

 

A States most basic responsibility is to keep its people

safe. The Commonwealth of Massachusetts was either

unable or unwilling to do what was necessary to protect

Jaime Caetano, so she was forced to protect herself. To

make matters worse, the Commonwealth chose to deploy

its prosecutorial resources to prosecute and convict her of

a criminal offense for arming herself with a nonlethal

weapon that may well have saved her life. The Supreme

Judicial Court then affirmed her conviction on the flimsi­

est of grounds. This Courts grudging per curiam now

sends the case back to that same court. And the conse­

quences for Caetano may prove more tragic still, as her

conviction likely bars her from ever bearing arms for self-

defense. See Pet. for Cert. 14.

 

If the fundamental right of self-defense does not protect

Caetano, then the safety of all Americans is left to the

mercy of state authorities who may be more concerned

about disarming the people than about keeping them safe.

 

 

 

6

The court below also noted that Massachusetts no longer requires a

license to possess mace or pepper spray. 470 Mass., at 783, 26 N. E. 3d,

at 695. But the law was changed in 2014, after Caetano was convicted.

A spray can also be foiled by a stiff breeze, while a stun gun cannot.

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The thread title is very deceiving. The Supreme Court sent it back to Massachusetts Judicial Court and it didn't reverse it.

 

" The challenge, filed by a woman who was arrested for carrying the weapon in her purse for protection, now gets new life. But rather than hearing the case themselves and potentially striking down the ban, the justices sent it back to the state's Supreme Judicial Court.

 

They reasoned that their own landmark decisions in District of Columbia v. Heller and McDonald v. Chicago were meant to protect even firearms "that were not in existence at the time of the founding." However, they stopped short of a blanket endorsement of stun guns."

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The thread title is very deceiving. The Supreme Court sent it back to Massachusetts Judicial Court and it didn't reverse it.

 

" The challenge, filed by a woman who was arrested for carrying the weapon in her purse for protection, now gets new life. But rather than hearing the case themselves and potentially striking down the ban, the justices sent it back to the state's Supreme Judicial Court.

 

They reasoned that their own landmark decisions in District of Columbia v. Heller and McDonald v. Chicago were meant to protect even firearms "that were not in existence at the time of the founding." However, they stopped short of a blanket endorsement of stun guns."

 

From the final paragraph of the SCOTUS order:

 

 

 

Consequently, the petition for a writ of

certiorari and the motion for leave to proceed in forma

pauperis are granted. The judgment of the Supreme

Judicial Court of Massachusetts is vacated, and the case is

remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with

this opinion.

 

What they did (in a unanimous ruling!) was to tell the SJC of Massachusetts that they screwed up, this is why you screwed up, your previous ruling is VACATED, now go and fix your mess and apply the law according to our interpretation.

 

This was a SPANKING by SCOTUS. The Mass. SJC wouldn't dare do anything but strike the law down after this. They screwed it up so bad that SCOTUS didn't even bother with a hearing or oral arguments, they just reversed it without listening to any excuses.

 

I think this will have implications for a lot of cases in the pipeline right now. I think that combining this ruling with Moore/Shepard, we should be able to get rid of the portion of UUW that prohibits carrying stun guns and tasers outside the home. And that's just for beginners.

 

-- Frank

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From the final paragraph of the SCOTUS order:

 

 

 

Consequently, the petition for a writ of

certiorari and the motion for leave to proceed in forma

pauperis are granted. The judgment of the Supreme

Judicial Court of Massachusetts is vacated, and the case is

remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with

this opinion.

 

What they did (in a unanimous ruling!) was to tell the SJC of Massachusetts that they screwed up, this is why you screwed up, your previous ruling is VACATED, now go and fix your mess and apply the law according to our interpretation.

 

This was a SPANKING by SCOTUS. The Mass. SJC wouldn't dare do anything but strike the law down after this. They screwed it up so bad that SCOTUS didn't even bother with a hearing or oral arguments, they just reversed it without listening to any excuses.

 

I think this will have implications for a lot of cases in the pipeline right now. I think that combining this ruling with Moore/Shepard, we should be able to get rid of the portion of UUW that prohibits carrying stun guns and tasers outside the home. And that's just for beginners.

 

-- Frank

 

Agreed. In legal terms, the MA courts just got spanked and sent to go clean up their room, by both parents.

 

I've believed for years that stun guns/tasers are "arms" and should have constitutional protection, and that at a practical level, it's ridiculous to allow people to carry a firearm while continuing to ban nonlethal or lesslethal options.

 

It might be a battle best waged legislatively, but there is certainly an opportunity for a legal challenge to the IL bans. This decision taken together with Moore/Shepard should be a slam dunk.

 

The question is will Illinois create yet another rube goldberg apparatus of a stun gun carry permit bureacracy or just let it go.

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...

I think this will have implications for a lot of cases ...

I think it has a lot of potential too and, as you noted, it was unanimous to boot.

 

This case has lot of potential. With the unanimous decision, it leaves me wondering about the end game from Breyer & Ginsberg. They both opposed Heller, and Heller (as well as McDonald v Chicago), were prominently mentioned in the decision. It all leaves me wondering where I left my tinfoil hat... :tinfoilhat:

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...

I think this will have implications for a lot of cases ...

 

 

I think it has a lot of potential too and, as you noted, it was unanimous to boot.

 

 

 

This case has lot of potential. With the unanimous decision, it leaves me wondering about the end game from Breyer & Ginsberg. They both opposed Heller, and Heller (as well as McDonald v Chicago), were prominently mentioned in the decision. It all leaves me wondering where I left my tinfoil hat... :tinfoilhat:

 

I think the anti-gun members of SCOTUS voted for this because they want to affirm their own supremacy. It is more important to them that SCOTUS precedent be followed than the politics of the issues involved.

 

Also, I can't help but wonder if this was done in tribute of their recently departed peer. My impression is that while they didn't agree with him philosophically, they liked and respected Scalia.

 

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This is the first 2A 'reverse and remand' I've seen (havn't looked that hard). Sweet!

I believe it's the first 2A decision from SCOTUS since McDonald.

 

The more I think about it, about the rationale that was used to justify the MA ban and how that rationale was summarily and forcefully rejected by SCOTUS, the more optimistic I become. It's the exact same language in Heller than all the AW ban cases and others have been attached to. MA may have just screwed the gun control cause with this overreach that pushed SCOTUS into action.

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Maybe the plaintiff being a woman helped bring the liberal justices to our side.

The failure of the state to enforce their own protection orders and their chosing to prosecute the abused woman for defending herself when she chose the least lethal weapon that she could find was the perfect storm of events that caused bipartisan support among all the justices to vacate the judgement of the lower court for being unconstitutional.
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This is the first 2A 'reverse and remand' I've seen (havn't looked that hard). Sweet!

I believe it's the first 2A decision from SCOTUS since McDonald.

 

The more I think about it, about the rationale that was used to justify the MA ban and how that rationale was summarily and forcefully rejected by SCOTUS, the more optimistic I become. It's the exact same language in Heller than all the AW ban cases and others have been attached to. MA may have just screwed the gun control cause with this overreach that pushed SCOTUS into action.

 

And not just AW's.

 

They explain their meaning in Heller that "The Court has held that the Second Amendment extends, prima facie, to all instruments that constitute bearable arms, ..."

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It means Illinois' prohibition is likely unconstitutional also, but someone needs to file a law suit to make it so. Based on the supreme Court ruling it would be a pretty easy case...

Or it'll pass quietly in a bill, kinda like how we got SBRs.

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The more I think about it, about the rationale that was used to justify the MA ban and how that rationale was summarily and forcefully rejected by SCOTUS, the more optimistic I become. It's the exact same language in Heller than all the AW ban cases and others have been attached to. MA may have just screwed the gun control cause with this overreach that pushed SCOTUS into action.

There are still the lower courts opinions that ARs are in some way 'unusual' or 'especially dangerous' to get kicked down....

 

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It means Illinois' prohibition is likely unconstitutional also, but someone needs to file a law suit to make it so. Based on the supreme Court ruling it would be a pretty easy case...

The same is true for certain aspects of Illinois's firearms laws. Caetano only became a SCOTUS case because a victim was herself victimized by a system determined to punish her for exercising her rights. You could, perhaps with a bit more difficulty, argue the same with our excessive permit fees, or the prohibition on transit carry. We just need a good plaintiff.

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This is the first 2A 'reverse and remand' I've seen (havn't looked that hard). Sweet!

 

 

I believe it's the first 2A decision from SCOTUS since McDonald.

 

The more I think about it, about the rationale that was used to justify the MA ban and how that rationale was summarily and forcefully rejected by SCOTUS, the more optimistic I become. It's the exact same language in Heller than all the AW ban cases and others have been attached to. MA may have just screwed the gun control cause with this overreach that pushed SCOTUS into action.

 

It's the first case in which SCOTUS didn't hear the case on its merits before deciding on it. First per curiam, analogous to a GVR order but since there's no directly controlling precedent, but tangential to Heller so that necessitated the per curiam opinion. Here's one paragraph in Alito's concurrence that has a ton of sharp teeth.

 

"The Supreme Judicial Courtâs holding that stun guns may be banned as 'dangerous and unusual weapons' fares no better. As the per curiam opinion recognizes, this is a conjunctive test: A weapon may not be banned unless it is both dangerous and unusual. Because the Court rejects the lower courtâs conclusion that stun guns are 'unusual,' it does not need to consider the lower courtâs conclusion that they are also 'dangerous.' See ante, at 1â2. But make no mistakeâthe decision below gravely erred on both grounds."

 

Justice Alito makes it crystal clear that the test for determining if a weapon is protected under the Second Amendment is if the weapon is both dangerous AND unusual. Not dangerous, not unusual, but dangerous AND unusual. Commonly possessed weapons cannot be dangerous and unusual because "common" is an antonym for unusual.

 

But wait, there's more.

 

"Instead, the court seized on language, originating in United States v. Miller, 307 U. S. 174 (1939), that 'the sorts of weapons protected were those "in common use at the time." 470 Mass., at 778, 26 N. E. 3d, at 692 (quoting Heller, supra, at 627, in turn quoting Miller, supra, at 179). That quotation does not mean, as the court below thought, that only weapons popular in 1789 are covered by the Second Amendment. It simply reflects the reality that the founding-era militia consisted of citizens 'who would bring the sorts of lawful weapons that they possessed at home to militia duty,' Heller, 554 U. S., at 627, and that the Second Amendment accordingly guarantees the right to carry weapons 'typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes,' id., at 625."

 

"Electronic stun guns are no more exempt from the Second Amendmentâs protections, simply because they were unknown to the First Congress, than electronic communications are exempt from the First Amendment, or electronic imaging devices are exempt from the Fourth Amendment."

 

That about spells out how to analyze whether a particular firearm or weapon is protected. Obama and Clinton should be nervous about this one.

 

Sent from my VK700 using Tapatalk

 

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Any hope that this:

 

"The Court has held that the Second Amendment extends, prima facie, to all instruments that constitute bearable arms"

 

can help us make machine guns legal in Illinois or open up the registry? After all, a machine gun most definitely qualifies as a "bearable arm."

There are lawsuits regarding MGs currently ongoing in two different federal districts addressing those points.

 

see:

http://www.sdslaw.us/#!nfa-cases/c1xu9

https://hellerfoundation.org/hvh/

http://www.ar15.com/forums/t_1_5/1681489_NFA_cases__Hollis_and_Watson_v__Lynch___new_5th_circuit_filing_3_8_16_p_187.html

 

Some of the exact language from the Caetano decision is on point to the issues in question in these suits.

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Any hope that this:

 

"The Court has held that the Second Amendment extends, prima facie, to all instruments that constitute bearable arms"

 

can help us make machine guns legal in Illinois or open up the registry? After all, a machine gun most definitely qualifies as a "bearable arm."

I was thinking about automatic knives, also.

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